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Abstract 
 
Both the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis have 
significantly impacted the monetary and credit conditions within the Eurozone. As result 
of the losses suffered on their portfolios as well the lack of confidence within the financial 
system, funding became more costly and difficult to obtain for banks, and therefore they 
decreased their credit supply to non-ﬁnancial corporations and households. Considering 
the importance of well-functioning credit markets for growth and macroeconomic 
stability, as well the decisive role that the restarting of credit plays in economic recovery 
after a downturn, there is a growing interest on the impact that recent crises have 
performed on bank supply of credit. Despite the relevance of the issue, we cannot find 
however significant literature for the specific case of Portugal. Trying to fill that gap, with 
this study we intend to provide a deep approach on the topic, by investigating to which 
extent the banks operating in Portugal and more vulnerable to the dry up in the interbank 
markets and to the sovereign debt shock have reduced lending to non-financial 
corporations during the period of the Global Financial and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, respectively. 
Key-words: Credit rationing; Credit supply; Financial Crisis; European Debt Crisis 
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1. Introduction 
The first was described as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 
second as the most immediate threat to global growth. Over the last almost 10 years, the 
Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis have determined the path 
where the economy goes, and the credit markets were no exception. Since the private 
sector depends on the access to credit to fund investment and consumption, i.e. since the 
dynamism of the real economy is highly dependent on the vitality of credit markets, a key 
question that has been raising special attention since 2007/2008 is how the referred crises 
affect the banking system and, as result of that, the availability of credit for companies 
and consumers. According to some authors (e.g. Del Giovane et al., 2013) credit market 
developments have been quite homogenous across countries during the first phase of the 
crisis. On the other hand, during the period of the Sovereign Debt Crisis only some 
countries seem to have been affected by the tensions on the sovereign markets, such that 
this period has been characterized by a significant heterogeneity.  
On the specific case of Portugal, there is no consensus regarding the effect that the Global 
Financial Crisis has had on the banking system and, then, on credit markets. In several 
circumstances, the leaders of the main Portuguese banks and also the representatives of 
the Bank of Portugal have expressed their confidence in the system and made public 
statements claiming that it was not vulnerable to the crisis and has remained strongly solid 
as it had no relevant exposure to the subprime and no real estate bubble took place in 
Portugal (as it happened, for instance, in Spain and Ireland). Notwithstanding, 
considering the low aggregate rate of savings in Portugal, and therefore, the high banks’ 
reliance on external funding, it is not clear if they were not significantly exposed to the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 through the interbank market, and if the global dry up on 
such market has not led Portuguese banks to face increasing funding costs, then passed 
to their clients through the adoption of more restrictive credit policies. In other words, we 
do not have a clear perception if some banks, possibly impacted by the liquidity shock 
occurred in the interbank markets, have reduced lending and/or increased the interest rates 
charged, therefore creating a credit crunch situation. On the other hand, regarding to the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the evidence is clear on the fact that Portugal was on the 
epicenter of the crisis and that the Portuguese banking system was deeply affected by that. 
Indeed, following the significant deterioration of Portuguese public accounts and also due 
to contagion effects from the Greek crisis, Portuguese Government sovereign yields 
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increased abruptly and, therefore, banks incurred in large losses as they held significant 
amounts of sovereign debt on their portfolios. Moreover, following the request for a 
bailout and the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF, the ECB and 
the European Commission, Portuguese banks were forced to initiate a process of 
deleveraging and to follow stricter rules in order to comply with the imposed capital 
ratios. Although the evidence shows that credit flows decreased in a significant way, and 
the circumstances suggest that there is a link between such decrease and the deterioration 
of the conditions within the Portuguese banking system, the true is that there is again no 
quantification of such effects, and there is no clear identification of the factors behind the 
reduction on credit granted to firms. As crises like the Global Financial Crisis and the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis have generally associated a deterioration on the 
economic outlook, it is possible that changes in credit markets were, in fact, induced by 
demand factors instead of supply motives.  
Understanding the determinants of credit market developments is, however, of utmost 
importance. Particularly when designing policy responses, decision-makers have to know 
exactly where a reduction in credit volumes or a rise in interest rates is the result of supply 
or demand effects as only in that way they are able to assess which kind of policy response 
is the most appropriate. 
Looking to contribute with this kind of knowledge on the specific case of Portugal - which 
until the moment received little attention in this regard - we study the effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis and the European Credit Crisis on the credit supplied to non-financial 
corporations. With that purpose, and in order to disentangle demand and supply factors, 
we follow the firm-fixed effects methodology first used by Khwaja and Mian (2008). 
Main findings suggest that during the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 banks that rely more 
on interbank market and, therefore, more exposed to the crisis have decreased lending at 
a larger scale. Similarly, during the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, banks 
with a higher portion of sovereign debt in their portfolios also reduced lending more than 
other banks. As we control for firm fixed effects, for both periods we find evidence of the 
occurrence of a credit crunch, as there is a reduction on credit supply, independent of 
demand.  
Next sections are organized as follows. On Section 2 we present an overview of the two 
crisis periods approached on this work, with the main concern of understanding the 
mechanisms that were behind the two crises, and particularly the channels through which 
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banks and credit supply became affected. On Section 3 the main literature is reviewed, 
with particular focus on the studies which analyze in an empirical way the effects of the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis on credit supply, 
as well on the existing literature for the specific case of Portugal. On Section 4 we perform 
an empirical study specifically for the Portuguese case, examining whether there was a 
credit crunch following the Subprime crisis in the US and the same for the period of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. On Section 5 we provide some details regarding the 
research that is in progress with the purpose to improve our analysis for future publication. 
Finally, in Section 6 main conclusions of this work are presented and some topics for 
future research are suggested. 
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2. The Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and the European Debt 
Crisis 
2.1 The subprime, No trust in the system and The Credit Crunch 
2.1.1 Cooking the perfect storm 
The steady growth and the low interest rates that prevailed during the late 90s and the 
beginning of the new century have created a supportive environment for credit expansion 
in the United States. With the flow of global savings both from emerging and oil-
exporting countries1 also contributing for lower long-term interest rates and stable 
macroeconomic conditions characterized by low volatility2, the US have experienced an 
authentic credit boom. 
While the general macroeconomic conditions were working as a strong incentive for 
credit growth both on the demand and supply side, the market for securitization has also 
witnessed huge developments. Historically, the mortgage market (the most important and 
developed in terms of securitization at that time) was dominated by savings and loans 
associations and also by commercial banks, which either held mortgages in their 
portfolios or securitized them through government-sponsored entities (GSEs) such as 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. Considering that the GSEs guarantee the 
timely payment of principal and interest on their mortgage backed-securities (MBS), 
they were permitted to securitize only investment grade mortgages. Consequently, since 
lenders who made non-investment grade loans were forced to keep them on their books, 
they had little appetite for making riskier loans. However, by the middle of the 90s, and 
particularly after the year 2000, the structure of the market changed significantly with the 
                                                          
1 In a speech made in 2005 as Governor of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke argued that the substantial 
expansion of the current account deficit in the United States, the equally impressive rise in the current 
account surpluses of many emerging-market economies, and a worldwide decline in long-term real interest 
rates could be  explained, in part, by the emergence of a “Global Saving Glut”, driven by the transformation 
of many emerging-market economies - notably, rapidly growing East Asian economies and oil-producing 
countries - from net borrowers to large net lenders on international capital markets (Bernanke, 2005). 
Another important reason was that following the Asian crisis of 1997, many affected countries, with the 
purpose to peg the exchange rates at an export-friendly level and to protect their currency regime hedging 
against a depreciation of their own currencies against the dollar, adopted a monetary policy based on the 
accumulation of official reserves denominated in currencies less vulnerable to speculative behavior. In this 
context, the demand for US dollar increased, as well for US Treasuries and US denominated bonds, which 
raised their prices and lowered the long-term interest rate (Mizen, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009). 
2 The period of declining macroeconomic volatility (low and stable inflation, strong and stable GDP growth) 
experienced in the United States (but also in many other advanced economies) from the mid-1980s to 2007 
is commonly referred as the “Great Moderation”. 
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appearance of a new class of specialized mortgage lenders and securitizers unrestricted 
by regulations governing traditional lending and securitization. Instead of securitize 
mortgages through GSEs, this new kind of lenders started to securitize them through 
unregulated, private conduits managed by investment banks, and in order to circumvent 
the problem of the GSE’s guarantee they re-designed the securities, issuing them with 
new mechanisms of credit enhancement. Specifically, it was in this context that emerged 
the division of the securities backed by a pool of mortgages into a cash flow waterfall 
that allocated default risk on the mortgages by a hierarchy of tranches, therefore allowing 
to create AAA securities from risky underlying mortgages (Levitin et al., 2009). Taking 
advantage from this tranching mechanism, riskier loans started to be used for 
securitization. Moreover, the demand of new categories of debt products (car loans, 
student loans, credit card payments, trade receivables, etc) for securitization purposes also 
intensified and new and more complex structured products were developed (like CDOs 
and CDOs-squared). Driven by the “private segment”, the market for securitization grew 
exponentially.  
With securitization growing in importance, banks moved from the traditional “originate-
to-hold” to the “originate-to-distribute” model. In the “originate-to-hold” model, the 
banks provide loans to firms and individuals and hold these loans until the maturity, which 
means they bear the credit risk as the assets stay in their balance sheet. On the other hand, 
in the “originate-to-distribute” model, the loans granted are repackaged and sold to a third 
party (the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), with loans being pooled, tranched and then 
resold via securitization), with banks retaining little or no interest in the pool of 
securitized assets. Because a substantial part of the risk is borne by other financial 
institutions (as we will see later this revealed not to be completely true) banks essentially 
face only the pipeline risk of holding a loan for some months until the risks are passed 
on, so they have little incentive to take particular care in approving loan applications and 
monitoring loans, i.e. they have little incentive to pay attention to the credit worthiness of 
its customers (Brunnermeier, 2009).  
Pressured by the intense demand for loans induced by low interest rates, and enabled by 
the adoption of this “originate-to-distribute” model to get additional funding without 
increasing the risk held in their portfolios, banks have progressively lowered their lending 
standards. In the case of the mortgage market, it was particularly evident, namely because 
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a third factor was contributing for that: the behavior of prices in the housing market. 
Indeed, as housing prices were continuously increasing, banks started to provide loans 
even to people with no proven capacity to repay them, just on the basis that in the limit 
the borrower could always refinance the loan using the increased value of the house (for 
instance, it became famous the NINJA loans, granted to people with no income, no job 
and no assets). With loans granted to people with a high probability to fail on repayments 
the conditions for the burst of the housing bubble to happen sooner or later were created. 
 
Regarding the question of the rising house prices it is also important to take another 
perspective on the role they have performed on the development of the Financial Crisis 
of 2007/2008, which means to focus on rating agencies. Accused for being one of the 
main responsible for the financial meltdown, rating agencies have performed a very poor 
job and acted negligently on the risk assessment of securitized assets during the years 
prior to 2007. As it came to public, rating agencies based their risk models on very 
unrealistic assumptions, namely they relied on the hypothesis of constantly appreciating 
home prices and ignored the possibility that those prices could fall3 (Coval et al., 2008). 
Notwithstanding, other reasons help to explain the wrongful behavior of institutions like 
Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. As noted by Brunnermeir (2009), rating agencies 
had an incentive to attribute better ratings to structured products as they collected higher 
fees on such kind of products. Indeed, the true is that banks worked closely with the rating 
agencies in order to ensure that AAA tranches were sliced exactly in the manner that these 
just crossed the dividing line to reach the AAA rating. 
 
The short-term incentives were, indeed, decisive over the course of events that led to the 
financial crisis and that became also evident when we look to the Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) market. Indeed, on such market, managers had a compensation structure that 
rewarded short-term revenues instead of long-term performance, such that selling CDSs 
today and worrying about counterparty risk tomorrow was also the most profitable 
                                                          
3 Until  that  point  the  American  economy  had  never  experienced  an economy-wide decrease in home 
prices of more than 1%, and past downturns in housing prices were primarily regional phenomena (Coval 
et al., 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009). Additionally to the assumption made on housing prices, the statistical 
models adopted by credit-rating agencies and professional investors were also based on historically low 
mortgage default and delinquency rates (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
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strategy to adopt. This, combined with the moral hazard which dominated the system, i.e. 
the generalized idea that CDS sellers like AIG were “too big to fail”, encouraged CDS 
sellers to issue more insurance than they could cover in the belief that any remaining 
losses would be socialized (Levitin et al., 2009). 
 
Returning to the main question of securitization, and in order to complete the description 
of the main factors that were on the origin of the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, it is 
important to refer a last aspect: the fact that banks increasingly financed their asset 
holdings with shorter maturity instruments, which left them especially vulnerable to a 
dry-up in funding liquidity. Indeed, in the years leading up to the crisis, the same 
financing maturity mismatch that characterized the traditional banking model was 
transferred to a shadow banking system of off balance-sheet investment vehicles and 
conduits set up for securitization purposes. As these vehicles adopted a strategy of 
investing in long-term assets and borrowing with short-term paper, and as to ensure 
funding liquidity for the vehicles the sponsoring banks granted them a credit line (the so-
called liquidity backstop), the liquidity risk from holding long-term assets and making 
short-term loans never left the system4 (even though it was not directly reflected on the 
banks’ balance sheets), making predictable that significant tensions would impact the 
financial system if any reduction in funding liquidity occurred (Brunnnermeir, 2009). 
 
  
                                                          
4 An additional explanation for the risk to have remained within the banking system is the evidence that 
banks were among the most active buyers of structured products. 
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2.1.2 When trust is the main piece 
As previously described, the combination of different factors have created the conditions 
for the perfect storm. The big question was when the storm would finally happen and 
what would effectively cause it.  
In early 2007 the answer arrived. Indeed, the increase in subprime mortgage defaults 
verified at that time just worked as the trigger for the subprime and financial crisis that 
followed. 
“The root  of the crisis: homeowners who could not make payments falling into foreclosure and the lenders 
putting these homes up for sale at fire sale prices, resulted in an increase in supply. This pushed down real 
estate values, which left many other homeowners with negative equity - their homes were worth less than 
they owed on their mortgages. Paying a mortgage on a  property  with negative equity  is  economic 
renting, and with  cheaper  rental  rates many  home owners  who  otherwise  would continue making 
payments despite financial reversals  simply stopped making their mortgage payments and walked away 
from their properties, feeding more  foreclosures.  More  fuel  was  thrown  on  this  fire  as  the  
economy declined. As unemployment rose more mortgages became  unaffordable, resulting  in  more  
foreclosures, and  further  price  declines leading to  more negative  equity.” (Levitin et al., 2009) 
Although these first signs have provoked some reactions from the market they were, 
however, just an indication of what was going to come. On April 2007, New Century 
Financial, a subprime specialist, have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. One month later 
UBS closed its internal hedge fund, Dillon Read, after incurring $125M in subprime 
mortgage-related losses. Also in May, Moody’s put 62 tranches across 21 subprime 
securitization deals on downgrade review, which led to a deterioration of mortgage-
related products. In subsequent months new episodes of downgrades and losses took 
place. Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s and Fitch, all they have downgraded the ratings of 
other tranches. At the same time, in June 2007, two hedge funds run by Bear Sterns had 
trouble meeting margin calls, requiring Bear Sterns to inject $3.2 billion to support the 
funds. Finally, in July, Countrywide, a major US mortgage lender, reported large losses. 
 
Until this moment the crisis was almost limited to the mortgage market and to the United 
States. However, soon the situation changed and the US subprime crisis turned into a 
Global Financial Crisis. Suddenly, problems in subprime market, which represented only 
a small proportion of total US mortgages, have spread to new domains and geographies. 
For instance, in Europe, the first big signal of the crisis appeared in July 2007, when 
German IKB Deutsche Interbank conduit incurred losses and revealed to be unable to roll 
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over its asset-backed commercial paper, then being bailed out by its major shareholder in 
August of the same year. Also in August, French bank BNP Paribas suspended 
withdrawals from three hedge funds heavily invested in CDOs, claiming its inability to 
value structured products. 
Two main factors proved to be crucial in the spread of the crisis.  
First of all, investors not only from US but internationally, all they were invested in ABS 
markets. In a context of low interest rates, traditional investments could not provide the 
higher yields the investors were looking for, so demand moved for innovative and riskier 
financial instruments and for greater leverage. New and more complex products were 
developed and much of this demand was satisfied by residential MBSs and CDOs, which 
were sold internationally, therefore spreading the inherent risks in the US subprime sector 
to international investors (Mizen, 2008).  
On the other hand, the asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) market froze, therefore 
contaminating other segments of the financial sector. Indeed, following some unexpected 
downgrades of mortgage-related products5, rating agencies were put under some criticism 
and began to reassess and adjust their ratings models for these kind of products, thereby 
introducing further uncertainty about the reliability of their ratings. At the same time, the 
losses incurred by some entities and the increasing concern and difficulty to value 
structured products6, together with the lack of confidence in rating agencies, have led 
investors to pull back from structured products in general. As the SIVs and conduits were 
traditionally funded through the issuance of short-term asset-backed commercial paper, 
the increasing uncertainty about the value and the exposures to underlying mortgage 
backed-securities made investors less willing to roll over the corresponding ABCP and, 
therefore, these entities became unable to obtain the necessary short-term funding from 
these markets. The need for rollover funding has then created additional pressure on 
banks’ liquidity, with banks being forced to rescue those SIVs and conduits they had 
sponsored by providing liquidity or by taking back their respective assets onto their 
                                                          
5 For instance, in June and July 2007, several assets backed by subprime residential MBS were downgraded 
by rating agencies from AAA to A+, i.e. four notches downs, which even led the OECD to comment and 
describe such downgrades as unexpected (Mizen , 2008) 
6 Regarding this it is important to mention that the fact there was no secondary market and financial 
institutional kept the securities in their portfolios and they were not actively traded made impossible to 
“keep the market honest”. Indeed, without  a  trading  market  for  the securities,  short-selling  couldn’t  
occur  and, therefore, without short-selling the market couldn’t indicate or correct underpricing. 
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balance sheets. As a result, the balance sheet of those financial institutions were 
particularly strained by this reabsorption, which in addition was amplified due to 
declining asset values7 and led banks to hoard liquidity in a way that the level of interbank 
lending declined significantly. 
As documented in the literature (Acharya et al., 2013; Nathaniel et al., 2008; Mizen, 
2008) both credit and liquidity risks are used to explain why banks have started to hoard 
liquidity. While the fear of counterparty risk, i.e. the uncertainty regarding the exposure 
of other banks to mortgage market and the losses they could incur was indeed important 
in the slowdown of lending relationships in the money market, with banks becoming 
reluctant to lend to each other unless they were compensated with larger risk premiums, 
it seems that the behavior adopted by banks was primarily conducted by liquidity 
concerns. This idea is precisely supported by Acharya et al. (2013) who claim that banks 
engaged in liquidity hoarding due to a precautionary response to its own heightened 
funding risk in markets for external finance in wake of increased risk or anticipation of 
losses and capital shortfalls. By studying the behavior of large settlement banks on the 
Sterling Money Market for the period between January 2007 and November 2008, the 
authors show that banks hold more liquidity on days with greater volume of payments 
and settlements activity, which are argued to be the days with greater uncertainty in terms 
of liquidity needs and which therefore have associated an increased risk of payment 
shortfall. This is especially true for banks which rely more heavily in wholesale funding 
and that incurred in greater losses during the crisis, in other words, weaker banks and 
banks with greater funding risk, which reinforces the idea that banks hoarded liquidity 
for precautionary motives instead of counterparty risk concerns. Furthermore, despite the 
results reveal a strong causal impact of liquidity on interbank rates, they do not show any 
difference on the effects on rates experienced on secured and unsecured interbank 
lending, which once again suggests the prevalence of the precautionary motive over the 
one associated with counterparty risk. Additionally to these findings, the authors verified 
that the rise in aggregate liquidity during the crisis has resulted in an increase on interbank 
                                                          
7 “A further strain on banks’ balance sheets came from warehousing a higher than expected amount of 
mortgages and leveraged loans, the latter usually passed on to investors in order to fund the highly leveraged 
debt deals of  private equity firms. Both the market for mortgages and leveraged loans dried up from the 
collapse of transactions in the mortgage-related securitization market and collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs). Banks also felt obliged to honor liquidity commitments to alternative market participants, such as 
hedge funds and other financial institutions, which also suffered from the drain of liquidity.” (Nathaniel et 
al., 2008) 
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rates due to a rise in the borrowing cost of weaker banks and also due to a rise in the 
lending rates demanded for such weaker banks. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that 
contagion took place: (i) in the form of an individual bank’s borrowing cost being 
determined by other banks’ hoarding behavior; and (ii) in the form of an individual bank’s 
hoarding behavior affecting other banks’ average borrowing cost8. 
 
  
                                                          
8 The impact of an individual bank’s hoarding behavior on the borrowing cost supported by other banks 
seems to be significant only when the individual bank is large and a prominent player in the interbank 
market (Acharya et al.,2013) 
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2.1.3 Spillover effects to the real economy and the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
The tensions in ABCP market have forced banks to rescue the SIVS and conduits they 
set up for securitization purposes and to take them back onto their balance sheets. 
Simultaneously, as investors pulled back from structured finance market, the value of the 
securitized mortgages and other structured products that banks held on their balance 
sheets declined abruptly, leading them to recognize extensive write-downs. The 
increasing distrust and uncertainty regarding the value of securitized assets as well on the 
exposures and potential losses have also induced banks to hoard liquidity. Therefore, the 
interbank funding costs increased and also as result of the frictions in the money market 
and subsequent funding liquidity costs pressures, banks were forced to deleverage, further 
depressing asset prices. 
As the subprime mortgage crisis rapidly evolved into a banking crisis, with banks 
showing depressed balance sheets and poor solvency conditions, the difficulties they 
faced to obtain funding soon transmitted to the real economy in the form of credit 
constraints. The volumes of credit provided to households and companies decreased and 
the interest rates asked for new loans increased. 
Aware of the impact that the tensions on the money markets was having on the banking 
system and also on the real economy, central banks reacted and looked to inject some 
liquidity in the system. On the beginning of August 2007, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) injected €95 billion in overnight credit into the interbank market, with additional 
operations totaling around €100 billion in the following weeks. Also in August, the 
Federal Reserve injected approximately $25 billion and extended its normal lending 
period to 30 days and cut the discount rate by 50 basis points. Following to this, further 
measures were adopted, with central banks extending, for instance, the type of 
instruments accepted as collateral and launching term lending programs. 
While the intervention of central banks was contributing to somehow alleviate the 
conditions, some events put additional pressure on the market. It was the case, for 
instance, of the Northern Rock bank run in 2007 and the arranged takeover of Bear 
Stearns by JP Morgan Chase as well the public rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
2008. Differently from these situations, where the consequences could be controlled and 
minimized as far as possible, the collapse of Lehman Brothers at September 2008 
revealed to be really disastrous for the global economy. Considering all that had happened 
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until then, the fall of Lehman Brothers had a much higher impact since it has brought into 
the game two new elements. First of all, the Lehman Brothers was the 4th largest 
investment bank in the US and one of the main ones worldwide. It had several 
counterparties across the globe, which in turn had connections with several other financial 
institutions, so the potential for contagion was tremendous. Besides that, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers meant the State was no longer the lender of last resort (at least, in certain 
situations it would not act like that), which significantly increased the uncertainty within 
the financial system and generated more fear among the investor community. 
“Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, panic set in that any bank, irrespective of its size, could go 
bankrupt. Market participants revised their investment decisions. The banks themselves started to fear that 
any of their counterparties could fail and stopped lending money to each other, causing the interbank 
market, which had already been under stress for months, to dry up. In the four weeks following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the European stock exchanges plunged by around 30%, more than the 
total fall recorded over the previous 12 months. The three-month Euribor spread, which measures tensions 
in the interbank market, more than doubled, exceeding 170 basis points.” 
(Speech by Lorenzo Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, 20 October 2008) 
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2.2 Public Debt, Banks fragilities and the New Credit Crunch 
2.2.1 It is all about debt and banks 
In the words of Caruana and Avdjiev (2012), the foundations of the European Debt Crisis 
lie on the confluence and interaction of three key initial conditions which revealed 
determinant on what turned to be an intertwined sovereign and banking crisis. First of all, 
when the global financial crisis erupted, many financial institutions were poorly 
capitalized and highly leveraged and presented significant balance sheet mismatches. 
Therefore, the fact that many banking systems of most major developed economies 
entered the crisis with inadequate capital made them quite vulnerable to the original 
shocks and exacerbated the perverse feedback effects between banks and sovereigns. Like 
banks, many sovereigns entered the crisis unprepared and without sufficient fiscal buffers 
to deal with the shocks that hit the international ﬁnancial system in 2007/2008 and the 
subsequent slowdown in economic activity. The macroeconomic stability characterized 
by low interest rates and growth and the private credit boom that allowed the states to 
achieve temporary, unsustainable increases in revenues have instilled the erroneous idea 
of security and encouraged them to implement expansionary policies in expansionary 
economic cycles and to live beyond their means. As consequence, even if governments 
were able to quickly provide the support required for the recapitalization of their banking 
system and to give a little stimulus for the economic recovery, the small reserves they 
held were not sufficient to give a sustainable response to the crisis. To add to this, the 
high degree of international integration and interconnection of the financial system 
aggravated the situation as the links among sovereigns and financial institutions around 
the world intensified and propagated the crisis. 
When we examine the countries that were on the epicenter of the European Debt Crisis, 
the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), we verify that different 
reasons made them the most vulnerable and harmed. Indeed, countries like Ireland and 
Spain entered in distress due to significant debt overhang in the financial sector. On the 
other hand, in countries such as Greece, Portugal and Italy the main problem was on 
public finance. During the crisis, however, the problems in banks and sovereigns actually 
became intertwined, as risk was transmitted from one sector to the other through multiple 
channels. 
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In the wake of the financial crisis, the first of the five PIIGS’s countries to show signs of 
distress was Ireland. As argued before, the Irish public accounts were sound: for most of 
the decade leading up to the crisis the country had achieved budget surpluses9 and the 
debt-to-GDP ratio stood at approximately 25% at the end of 2007. However, the banking 
sector was highly dependent on international markets, where banks were able to find at a 
low cost the funds with which they fueled the Irish property bubble and consumption and, 
therefore, much of the country’s growth. Besides that, the increased competition 
contributed to very low loan spreads and a loosening of lending standards. As the global 
financial crisis emerged and international credit markets gradually froze, the Irish banks 
lost their main source of funding. Additionally, the collapse of construction sector, to 
which banks have provided large amounts in loans, and the fall in property prices led 
them to incur in huge losses. Moreover, many financial institutions were exposed to a 
significant amount of low-quality, subprime debt from the US, which reinforced their 
vulnerability to the financial crisis. 
In order to avoid further deterioration of the conditions in which the financial sector was 
operating, and in an attempt to limit its repercussions to the real economy, the Irish 
government launched several actions to support its banking system: from the provision 
of a general guarantee of the liabilities of the banking system to banks’ recapitalizations 
and nationalizations and the creation of a “bad bank” to dispose of low-quality assets 
within the system10. With the costs of rescuing the financial sector hitting the 40 billion 
euros until 2010, and with tax revenues significantly declining due to the collapse of the 
housing sector, Irish budget balances rapidly evolved from surpluses to deficits: after a 
small surplus of 0.1% in 2007, it rapidly declined to -7.4% in 2008 and up to -32% in 
2010 (more than ten times the limit imposed on Eurozone economies by Brussels). 
                                                          
9 The only exception was 2002, when it showed a deficit of -0.3%. However, from that year until 2007 the 
Irish Government always achieved a budget surplus, which increased year over year from 2003 to 2006 
(2003: 0.4%; 2006: 2.9%).  
10 In September 2008, the government provided a general guarantee of the liabilities of the banking system. 
This guarantee covered a broad range of liabilities (from deposits to some existing subordinated debt and 
covered bonds) for a period of two years and was intended to promote confidence and improve the banks’ 
funding situation (a second guarantee scheme was also later implemented). Following to this, and once the 
authorities became aware that the banks’ problems were not limited to the difficulty of get funding but were 
also related to their weak solvency conditions,  the Government decided to recapitalize the banking system. 
In this context, by June of 2009 the Government had injected 10 billion euros into the three major banks. 
Moreover, on January 2009 it nationalized Anglo Irish Bank, the Irish Republic’s third largest lender, as its 
insolvency seemed to be even closer. Furthermore, and still in 2009, it was established the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA), with the objective of removing commercial property and development 
loans from banks’ balance sheets (Honohan, 2012; Gerlach, 2013). 
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Simultaneously, public debt rose abruptly, increasing about four times in a five years’ 
time frame: right after the first signals of the financial crisis being felt in Ireland the public 
debt almost doubled to 45% in 2008; just two years later, in 2010, it reached the 87.4% 
and in 2011 it surpassed the barrier of the 100%.  
 
Similarly to Ireland, the cessation of the credit boom was especially troubling for Spain. 
Although the fiscal position was apparently healthy – at the end of 2007 Spain had the 
third largest budget surplus of Euro Area (1.9%) and a debt to GDP ratio of 36.1%11 -, 
before the crisis the economy was heavily reliant on a credit-fueled bubble in residential 
property and construction, and banks also relied a lot on cheap credit available in the 
international financial markets. Like this, the decline in construction sector was a major 
shock to domestic economic activity. In other words, as credit markets froze and the real 
estate bubble burst, the Spanish economy lost its major engine for economic growth. From 
a GDP growth rate above 3% previous to 2008 and even positive, at 1.1%, in that same 
year, it declined abruptly to -3.7% in 2009 and remained negative in the following years. 
In the same way, unemployment also rose much significantly – it surpassed the 10% in 
2008 and reached levels near 20% in 2009 and 2010 - with the cost of the country’s 
unemployment insurance spiking at a time when tax revenues dropped. Moreover, banks 
accumulated significant losses as several projects were abandoned and housing prices fell 
significantly and as the likelihood of defaults on mortgage payments and business loans 
increased with higher unemployment. 
Looking to fight recession and unemployment and to stabilize the financial sector, the 
Spanish Government took some measures. Particularly regarding the banking system, it 
was created in 2009 a state-backed bank restructuring fund, the FROB (Fund for Orderly 
Bank Restructuring), intended to promote the merger of regional savings banks (“cajas”) 
and thus improve solvency and make them more efficient. Later, the FROB was given 
extra powers in order to directly inject cash into those lenders facing trouble to get the 
private funds needed to raise their capital ratios up to minimum levels. Like in the case 
of Ireland, the adoption of these policies led to a serious deterioration of public accounts. 
                                                          
11 After three decades of budget deficits, Spain was able to rebalance its budget and to bring it into positive 
levels from the year 2005 until 2007. Indeed, the recovery was evident all along the first years of the new 
millennium (and even before that), and it also became reflected in the debt to GDP ratio which declined 
from more than 60% in the years prior 2000 to levels below 40% in 2006 and 2007 (so, clearly below the 
60% ceiling established in the Stability and Growth Pact). 
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The Government has accumulated successive and sizable deficits - for instance, -4.5% 
immediately in 2008, -11.1% in 2009 and -9.4% in 2010 and 2011- and the public debt 
has risen above the 60% of GDP in 2010 and near 70% in 2011. 
 
Both the cases of Ireland and Spain are perfect examples of how the distress in banking 
system has been transmitted to the public sector in the years following the Global 
Financial Crisis. Considering the importance it played on the beginning of what was then 
called the European Debt Crisis, several authors have written about the mechanisms 
through which this transmission of financial sector risk to sovereigns operates. In the 
words of Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012a), the most immediate way in which the tensions 
on the banking system can spill over to sovereigns is through the perceived cost of bank 
rescue. The main idea is that markets incorporate the expectations regarding a future 
bailout in current prices, which means that as they reflect the concerns about the future 
sustainability and creditworthiness of the sovereign, prices move up. If the simple 
anticipation of a future bailout may impact prices, in the sense it leads to an increase of 
government yields and sovereign CDS spreads, the same applies when public financial 
support is effectively provided to one or more banks. Indeed, no matter the form that 
public support takes (liquidity assistance, direct injections of capital, asset purchase 
programs or debt guarantees), the government balance sheet becomes weakened with the 
increase of explicit or implicit obligations (Caruana and Avdjiev, 2012). Sharing the view 
of the referred authors, Acharya et al. (2012) consider that these financial sector bailouts, 
although intended to rescue strategic but distressed banks and to avoid a credit crunch 
and subsequent loss of real sector output, are costly and run the risk of amounting to what 
they call a “Pyrrhic victory for the sovereigns”. In one hand there is a negative impact on 
the liability side of the government balance sheet, as mentioned by Caruana and Avdjiev 
(2012). On the other hand, if the value of the bailouts achieve such a level that puts into 
question even the soundness of the sovereign, and if it then creates within the private 
sector the expectation that the sovereign’s additional debt will lead to a higher taxation, 
it is possible that as this dilutes long-run returns in real sector and human-capital 
investments, the resulting under-investment in the economy can cause growth and 
productivity to slow down, affecting the sovereign’s credit risk through the asset-side of 
its balance sheet. Even when there is no bailout, the tensions on financial sector can be 
transmitted into sovereigns in the form of declining tax revenues and increasing 
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government expenditures (Caruana and Avdjiev, 201212). Indeed, as the bank fragilities 
both in terms of funding and solvency result in credit supply constraints, it is probable 
that there is a downturn in economic activity, accompanied by diminishing value on 
collected taxes and higher costs with unemployment insurance. 
While all these views were built on the evidence found during the European Debt crisis, 
the true is that they are in accordance with the idea that several other authors have 
expressed that banking crises are many times followed by a sovereign debt crisis (e.g. 
Valencia and Laeven, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) 
 
Unlike Ireland and Spain, in the case of Greece and Portugal (and also Italy) the crisis 
had its starting point on the fragilities of the public sector. Indeed, as we analyze the 
historical data on both countries we find that they accumulated successive budget deficits 
for more than four decades and that their public debt increased to excessive, unsustainable 
levels namely considering their lack of competitiveness and incapacity to generate 
significant economic growth. For instance, in Portugal, the last time the Government was 
able to reach a budget surplus was in 1973. In the five years comprehending 2004 to 2008, 
the fiscal deficit always surpassed the 3%, and the government debt to GDP ratio 
increased from approximately 58% in 2004 (below the 60% barrier) to near 72% in 2008. 
In an even worse situation, Greece budget deficits stood always above the 5%, and the 
public debt reached the 100% in 2005, then increasing to approximately 105% by the end 
of 2007. 
 
Once again risk was transmitted between the public and financial sectors, but at this time 
in the opposite direction. According to the literature (BIS, 2011; Acharya et al., 2012; 
Caruana and Avdjiev, 2012; Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012a), several mechanisms may 
justify why the deterioration in public accounts and sovereign’s creditworthiness possibly 
feedback adversely onto the financial sector. One of the channels through which it may 
occur involves the direct portfolio exposure of banks to sovereign debt. Indeed, as banks 
                                                          
12 This idea is also shared by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). According to the authors, only part of the huge 
debt increase observed in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises can be directly attributed to the bank rescue, 
while a considerable part of it is the result of the collapse in tax revenues in the wake of the slowdown in 
economic activity associated with banking crises. 
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hold significant amounts of sovereign debt13, the higher bond yields and lower bond 
prices that result from the increasing sovereign risk mean that banks incur in losses and 
that the value of their portfolio becomes negatively affected. As these losses weaken 
banks’ balance sheets via the effect on profitability and capital, the perceived risk of banks 
also increases and funding becomes more costly and difficult to obtain. Of course we may 
say that if the bank’s exposure to sovereign debt is adequately dispersed among countries 
with different risk profile, the impact that tensions in sovereign markets have on banks’ 
balance sheet is not so alarming. Regarding this topic, however, Acharya et al. (2012)14 
show evidence that during the European Debt Crisis home bias in government bond 
holdings was on average close to 60% and it was particularly strong for banks of troubled 
sovereigns, which means they were particularly vulnerable to shocks on sovereign debt 
markets through this balance sheet channel of risk transmission. One other channel trough 
which risk may be transmitted is the so-called liquidity channel. Since banks traditionally 
resort to sovereign securities as collateral to secure wholesale funding from central banks, 
private repo markets and covered bond markets, the higher sovereign risk reduces the 
value (or even the eligibility) of the collateral they can use, and so their funding capacity. 
The implicit and explicit guarantees that the government provides to the financial sector 
are also referred to play an important role. Indeed, when banks enter in a situation of 
distress it is common to see the government providing them some support, for example, 
through bank recapitalizations. Moreover, and despite some exceptional episodes, the 
government is still perceived as the lender of the last resort, the one that is there to bailout 
a bank when it seems to be no other solution to avoid its bankruptcy. Considering this, as 
the sovereign’s creditworthiness declines and a government is perceived to be in a weaker 
fiscal position, it provides less credible and valuable guarantees or financial support to 
banks, and this increases the credit risk of the financial institutions. Related to this we 
must refer the ratings channel. The idea here is that downgrades in sovereigns’ ratings 
tend to negatively influence the ratings of domestic banks, therefore increasing their 
funding costs and potentially impairing their access to money market and deposit markets. 
Besides these four channels typically mentioned by major authors, Caruana and Avdjiev 
(2012) make reference to two additional mechanisms of risk transmission. One of these 
                                                          
13 Government bonds were especially demanded by banks because they could be easily used as collateral 
and due the Basel regulatory framework, which allowed for the zero-risk weighting of bonds issued by euro 
area governments. 
14 See also Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012b). 
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mechanisms relates to the possibility of government debt crowding out private sector 
debt. According to these authors, banks and sovereigns compete to raise funds from 
investors, particularly when the sovereign loses its riskless status once the two forms of 
debt become closer substitutes in investor’s portfolios. Therefore, as sovereign risk 
increases, and increases the cost of sovereign debt (and so the remuneration for investors), 
the same tends to occur to the cost of bank debt, whose availability possibly also 
decreases. The other mechanism mentioned by the two authors is linked with the 
possibility that the loss of market confidence in sovereign debt may trigger fiscal 
consolidation, which by affecting aggregate demand and economic activity may then 
further impact credit quality and bank profitability. 
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2.2.2 But it is also much about contagion 
As we have seen before, countries like Ireland and Spain were particularly vulnerable to 
the effects of the Global Financial Crisis as their banking systems were highly dependent 
on international interbank markets and economic growth was strongly driven by the credit 
boom in real estate and construction sectors. The fragilities of national banks forced the 
Governments of both countries to take measures and as, result of that, budget surpluses 
turned into deficits and public debt increased significantly. Notwithstanding some initial 
expected tensions, Euro Area sovereign debt markets remained relatively calm during 
2008 and most of 2009 (Lane, 2012). In Ireland, the yield on ten-year government bonds 
floated between 4% and 5% in 2008, and after a rapid increase reaching a peak above the 
6% in the beginning of 2009 (in reaction to the nationalization of the Anglo Irish Bank) 
it returned again to the 4.5%/5% in the second semester of the year. On the other hand, in 
Spain, the behavior of yields was a little more erratic. Still, after a slight increase in the 
first six months of 2008, it tended to decline until the end of 2009, from about 5% to 
3.5%. 
In late 2009, however, the European Debt Crisis entered a new phase, particularly with 
the news originated in Greece (Lane, 2012). On October 2009, newly elected Greek 
government revised the country’s 2008 deficit to 7.7% of GDP rather than the 5% 
previously reported by the preceding government, and also revised the 2009 deficit 
projection upward from 3.7% of GDP to 12.5%. In subsequent months, the Government 
announced it would implement several austerity measures and on January 2010 it also 
presented a three-year reform plan that was dismissed as being overly optimistic. 
Following these adverse developments, rating agencies downgraded the rating for Greece 
sovereign debt, markets reacted with loss of confidence and yields on Greek sovereign 
bonds rose significantly. The access to financial markets became increasingly difficult 
and costly, and so on May 2010, when there were serious fears that Greece could enter in 
a situation of default, Greek Prime Minister called for a Eurozone-IMF rescue package 
and Eurozone finance ministers agreed to provide €110 billion in financial assistance over 
a period of three years. 
With the developments on Greece, investors started to fear that countries with poor 
fundamentals could also enter in a similar situation. Therefore, they have increasingly 
sought refuge from the sovereign debt of risky countries, and started to invest in countries 
seen as safe like Germany. Rapidly, the yields on sovereign debt of Portugal and Ireland 
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also moved up and both countries were forced to require a bailout. Then, on a second 
phase, the yields of Spain and Italy were also negatively affected.  
As suggested by many authors, all these countries were “victim” of a sovereign-sovereign 
contagion phenomenon with origin on the Greek debt crisis. Regarding that, Constâncio 
(2012) presents two different approaches to investigate contagion during the European 
Debt Crisis. The first approach is a state-space model performing, in real time, 
multivariate frequency decompositions. By applying that model, the author finds 
evidence that contagion from Greece, Ireland and Portugal explains a significant share of 
Italian and Spanish government bond yields evolution, of around 30/40% in 2011. The 
second approach estimates the effect of an increased probability of a default for one 
country on the likelihood of a default for other countries, with probabilities being 
estimated from premiums of sovereign credit default swaps traded in the market. 
Following this approach, the findings show that contagion effects between Greece and 
Portugal and Ireland were at play in 2009 and 2011. 
Similar conclusions are reached by Missio and Watsaka (2012), who by estimating 
dynamic conditional correlation models for government yields spreads of selected Euro-
area countries identify contagion effects from Greece to other Euro-area countries, 
namely Ireland, Portugal and Spain, generated by negative rating announcements in 
Greece between 2009 and 2010. 
In the same direction, Mink and de Haan (2013) observe that news about both the 
economic situation in Greece and a Greek bailout have had an impact on sovereign yields 
of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Notwithstanding, according to the authors this impact may 
not necessarily mean contagion, as it is also in line with the so-called “wake-up call” 
view. According to this view a crisis initially restricted to one country may provide new 
information prompting investors to reassess the vulnerability of other countries.  
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3. Literature Review 
In Section 2 we had the opportunity to mention some of the most important papers that 
have been written regarding both the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, and particularly on the mechanisms through which problems in specific 
financial segments or in the public sector are transmitted into the banking industry and, 
in turn, to the real economy through the bank lending channel. In this section our purpose 
is different. Looking to provide a comprehensive framework for the study to be performed 
in Section 4, our intention here is to make a deep review of the empirical studies 
developed regarding the impact that the two recent crises have had on credit supply, 
giving particular attention to the results obtained, but also importantly on the different 
methodologies applied. 
 
Our work is related and contributes to different strands of the literature. From a broad 
perspective, it is related with the literature that studies the costs of banking crises and 
credit crunches (e.g. Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengreen 
2000; Ongena et al., 2003) 
However, our study is focused on two specific events, and how they have affected the 
banking sector and the real economy. In this regard we may clearly distinguish two kinds 
of scientific research. On the one hand, we have some authors that focus their analysis on 
the way banks’ performance has evolved during the period of the Global Financial 
Crisis/European Sovereign Debt Crisis, considering their prior vulnerability to the shock 
(e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Hoque, 2013; Angeloni and 
Wolff, 2012; Correa et al., 2014; Arezki et al., 2012). For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2009) find that during the Global Financial Crisis better capitalized banks 
achieved a better stock market performance, particularly in the case of larger banks. On 
the other hand, we find some studies that focus directly on the impact of the crises on real 
economy, namely on GDP growth (e.g. Fuerceri and Zdzienicka, 2011; De Paoli et al., 
2009). Using a sample of 154 countries for the period between 1970 and 2008, Fuerceri 
and Zdzienicka (2011) analyze the short and medium-term impact of debt crises on 
output, with the results suggesting that in short-term a debt crisis leads the GDP growth 
to decline by about 6 percentage points while in medium-term (for instance, eight years 
after the occurrence of the crisis) the output tends lower by about 10 percent. Besides 
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present evidence that debt crises produce significant and long-lasting output losses, this 
study also suggests that GDP growth declines by about 1.8 percentage points when the 
gross debt-GDP ratio exceeds 70 percent. In line with this, by analyzing 40 episodes of 
sovereign debt crises, De Paoli et al. (2009) find evidence not only on the fact that output 
losses are prolonged and large but also that they tend to be of a much larger dimension 
when associated with banking and currency crises.  
In a more particular way, our work tries to understand how bank lending has been 
impacted by the two shocks, for the specific case of banks operating in Portugal. The 
reason for this study basically lies on the fact that Portuguese firms are, in general, highly 
dependent on credit markets such that they are extremely vulnerable to credit rationing 
events and, therefore, events of that kind may significantly damage the economy thus 
requiring special attention as to be avoided and minimized. Considering this is the strand 
of the literature which our study is most related with, in the next subsections we review 
the main research made on bank lending during the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, and also for the specific case of Portugal. 
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3.1 Global Financial Crisis 
Regarding the period of the Global Financial Crisis, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) has 
become a reference and one of the most cited papers on the topic. With a strong 
descriptive nature, this study provides a deep and very detailed analysis on the behavior 
of lending in US during the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, covering all the different 
segments of the market and describing the main movements occurred in each one of them. 
While the conclusions are numerous, each of particular interest per se, there are two that 
deserve our special attention. Regarding to the general levels of lending, the authors find 
that new lending in 2008 was significantly below new lending in 2007, even before the 
banking panic in the fourth quarter of 2008, with the level of loans granted depressing, 
however, at a more accelerated pace during the banking panic period15. Moreover, taking 
into consideration each segment individually, the authors also find that lending volumes 
decreased across all types of loans16. With a contribution to the literature that goes beyond 
this kind of descriptive characterization, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) also examine 
the cross-sectional determinants of bank lending during the financial crisis. Looking to 
test whether banks more vulnerable to the shock have reduced their lending in a greater 
magnitude as compared to other banks, the authors find that banks with low deposit 
financing and, therefore, more reliant on short-term funding, and also banks with a greater 
risk of credit-line drawdowns, experience more declines in lending. In line with Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010), the studies developed by Kwan (2010) and Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011) also find evidence of deteriorating conditions in credit supply 
during the Global Financial Crisis. With focus on US, but this time on the loan interest 
rates instead of the volumes of credit granted, Kwan (2010) finds that during the period 
of the crisis the cost of commercial and industrial loans17 was, on average, 66 basis points 
                                                          
15 In the fourth quarter of 2008, the dollar volume of lending was 47% lower than it was in the prior quarter 
and the number of issues was 33% lower than it was in the prior quarter. 
16 Regarding the dollar volume of restructuring loans as at the fourth quarter of 2008, the authors find that 
it is 84% below its level at the peak of the credit boom, while for real investment loans it was 72% below 
its level at the peak. For the case of investment-grade lending it was 77% less than its level at the peak of 
the credit boom, and non-investment grade lending was 91% below the peak. Regarding the new issues of 
credit- lines facilities and term loans both declined, but the decline in term loans (67%) was larger than the 
decline in credit lines (27%). 
17 While the paper from Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) resorts to information from syndicated loan market, 
Kwan (2010) uses a sample that includes all commercial and industrial loans made by a panel of 350 
domestic large and small banks (for the period between 1997 and 2010), which means that it covers a wider 
range of borrowers as the access to syndicated loan market is more limited to larger companies. 
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or 23 percent above normal, i.e. above its long-term average (here interpreted as the 
average for the period between 1997 to 2010).  
Between the second quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2010 the loan rate spread 
increased by almost 1 percentage point. According to the authors, this tightening effects 
appears to have been stronger within large and medium-sized banks, which raised their 
loan spreads on about 30% (against the 8% verified for small banks), while they find no 
evidence that bank-dependent borrowers18 have suffered more from bank tightening than 
other borrowers. Additionally, by adjusting their pooled time-series cross-sectional model 
to include four new variables that account for bank specific characteristics, the authors 
also find that the loan portfolio quality, the capital ratios and the amount of unused loan 
commitments have an impact on loan prices, while profitability does not seem to affect 
loan pricing19. All-in-all, these findings provide evidence in support of the supply-side 
effect of loan pricing. On the other hand, the study developed by Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011) is centered on the effect of the Global Financial Crisis in Europe. 
Using a sample of more than 1.000 banks from GIIPS countries, Core-European countries 
and also US for the period between 1999 and 2009, this paper provides answers to three 
specific questions: a) Do certain bank-specific characteristics affect the loan supply?; b) 
Do certain bank-specific characteristics affect the impact of monetary shocks on the 
lending supply?; c) Have these effects changed in magnitude during the financial crisis 
of 2007/2008? In spite of the conclusions on each one of these questions, what deserves 
our biggest attention in this paper is the fact that, regarding the importance of the 
traditional variables typically used in the study of loan supply movements, the authors get 
some "surprising" results that do not confirm the predictions of most theoretical models. 
Clarifying this observation, it is worth to mention that according to the estimates of the 
authors both the size and the liquidity of the banks seem not to influence credit supply 
(during normal times and also during the crisis period), while the effect of bank capital 
                                                          
18 To identify bank-dependent borrowers the authors use as proxy instrument the loan size. Small loans are 
proxies for small borrowers who are less likely to have access to the capital market and who are more likely 
to be dependent on a relationship with a single bank. 
19 Loan portfolio quality: particularly in the case of large banks and, at a larger scale, in the case of small 
banks, institutions with poorer portfolio quality charge a higher loan rate. Capital ratios: for large and 
medium banks higher capital ratios are associated with higher interest rates reflecting the idea that more 
risk-averse banks choose to hold more capital; for small banks lower capital ratios are associated with 
higher loan rates, which is consistent with the idea that banks capital constrained reduce lending. Amount 
of unused loan commitments: independently of the size of the bank, banks with more unused loan 
commitments -which are associated with excess lending capacity- charge lower interest rates. 
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seems to have a negative effect on lending during normal times (contradicting the general 
idea that well-capitalized banks provide more credit20) and exactly the opposite effect 
during the crisis (during this kind of periods, capital works as a buffer to compensate 
adverse shocks). Indeed, during the years leading to the crisis, credit supply is apparently 
driven by bank capital but also by securitization activity. Securitization activity is 
positively related with credit growth, which is consistent with the idea that it works as a 
source of capital relief and additional funding (this idea is also supported by Altunbas et 
al., 2009). Moreover, during the crisis period the importance of the banks' business 
models on credit supply is even more evident as not only securitization activity appears 
to influence lending but the same happens with the reliance on short-term funding and the 
weight of non-traditional (non-interest income) activities (even in these two cases the 
effect is negative). In summary, all these results suggest that there were deep changes on 
the bank-related factors determining bank lending and also on the whole monetary 
transmission mechanism21 prior to and during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Following 
the deregulation, financial innovation and increasing role of institutional investors, new 
factors more related with the banks' business model assumed a higher relevance compared 
to more traditional variables such as size and liquidity. 
 
Common to the three studies analyzed above we have the fact that they rely on loan data 
only disaggregated at the bank level. As further developed in next subsection, this 
represents a limitation in terms of the disentanglement of supply and demand effects on 
bank lending. In this regard, the methodologies followed by Sette and di Patti (2012) and 
Bord and Santos (2014) allow to avoid such problems. Relying on a sample of 630.000 
bank-firm relationships in Italy in the first phase of the Global Financial Crisis (June 
2007-December 2007) and 655.000 in the second one (June 2008-December 2008), and 
                                                          
20 This result is, however, consistent with the thesis that higher levels of capital during normal times reflect 
a higher risk aversion and, therefore, more restrictions when supplying credit. 
21 Analyzing the interaction between bank-specific characteristics and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, the authors also find surprising results as they suggest that size and liquidity do not matter 
for the way as bank lending reacts to monetary changes during normal times, while the same is found for 
liquidity and capital during the crisis period. Also controversial is the result found for the role of 
securitization: banks more active in securitization market are able to lend more both during normal times 
and the crisis period and there is a positive interaction between securitization and monetary policy which 
means they are better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks related to the availability of external 
finance. Although this insulation effects reduces during the crisis period, considering the fact that banks 
have difficulties in originating and distributing asset-backed securities, the fact is that it not reflects the idea 
banks more exposed to this market incurred in higher losses in their balance-sheets and then became more 
financially constrained and started lending less. 
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following the firm-fixed effects methodology of Kwaja and Mian (2008) – also explained 
in more detail in next subsection -, Sette and di Patti find that during the first phase of the 
crisis, credit supply was mainly impacted by the banks’ reliance on interbank funding, as 
well on the level of activity in securitization markets prior to the crisis and on the share 
of liquid assets. Indeed, as reported by the authors: a) a one standard deviation increase 
in the exposure to the interbank market leads to a decrease on lending by 0.86 p.p. (and 
an increase on interest rates of 17 b.p.); b) a one standard deviation increase in the ratio 
of amount of loans securitized to total assets leads to a reduction of 1.5 p.p in credit 
granted (and an increase on interest rates of 52 b.p.) and; c) a one standard deviation 
decrease in the share of liquid assets leads to a decrease of 0.56 p.p.. Regarding the level 
of capitalization, loan write-offs and ROA, their effect seems to be negligible. On the 
other hand, during the second phase of the crisis, i.e. after the fall of the Lehman Brothers, 
bank profitability and the reliance on interbank funding appear to be the main factors 
determining the volumes of credit granted (a one standard deviation increase in the 
exposure to the interbank markets and on the ROA leads, respectively, to a decrease on 
lending of 0.71 and 2.55 p.p.) while the level of loan charge-offs significantly impacts the 
cost of credit. As regard liquidity, it seems to play a more limited role due the support 
provided by the Eurosystem to the banking sector.22 While the methodology followed by 
Sette and di Patti (2012) is more common to find after being introduced by Kwaja and 
Mian (2008), the approach of Bord and Santos (2014) is very unusual and unique. 
Exploring the liquidity shock that impacted the banking system following the collapse of 
the ABCP market in the fall of 2007, Bord and Santos (2014) try to establish a link 
between a bank's liquidity position and credit supply, with main focus on the price it 
charges to corporations for granting them access to liquidity (the undrawn fee) during the 
period of crisis. By using as proxy for the liquidity shock (i.e. as measure of their 
vulnerability to the shock) the amount of funding that banks raised from the sources of 
liquidity to which they resort mainly when they are unable to meet their liquidity needs 
in the market (for instance, the FHLB system and the Fed’s discount window), the authors 
find that: (i) banks' use of this funding sources does play a more important role on the 
                                                          
22 In line with this paper, Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) analyze the six month period after Lehman 
collapsed (September 2008-March 2009) to explore the relevance of evergreening by banks and the role of 
bank capital, and they find a negative effect on the growth of loans to risky borrowers for larger less-
capitalized banks but no effect for smaller less-capitalized banks, which suggests that other determinants 
could be playing a role. 
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undrawn fees that banks charge on the credit lines they extend during the crisis, when 
compared to the pre-crisis period; (ii) banks that had to resort to these sources increased 
more the price they charged corporations for granting them access to liquidity, with this 
effect being driven by banks' larger exposure to the ABCP market23,24. Additionally to 
these findings, the authors also conclude that these effects are more pronounced among 
credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks (i.e. the ones that require banks to set 
aside more liquidity to meet their funding demands as the borrowers tend to draw down 
more frequently on their available lines or they have a less predictable drawdown pattern). 
They also conclude that banks differentiate among their borrowers and pass their 
additional cost of accessing liquidity only onto their dependent borrowers. Altogether, 
these ﬁndings provide important support to the thesis that banks’ liquidity condition does 
play an important role on the price they charge to corporations seeking access to liquidity. 
Going a little further, the authors apply the same kind of analysis to the all-in-drawn 
spread (which also incorporates the credit spread, set to compensate the bank credit risk 
of the borrower), and by also distinguishing between the effect on credit lines with high 
and low liquidity risk they get additional evidence on the fact that changes in the prices 
charged on supplied credit were driven by the deterioration on banks' liquidity conditions 
(supply factor) and not on the risk of borrowers (demand factor). 
 
Resorting to much less richer data, i.e. by following a cross-country panel-econometric 
approach, and relying on aggregated information (by country) on the quarterly growth of 
loans both to firms and households as well on banks' responses to the Bank Lending 
Survey (which allows for disentangling loan supply and demand effects), Hempell and 
Sorensen (2010) find evidence that factors associated with banks’ balance sheet positions 
are important for credit supply in the Euro-Area, both in terms of prices and volumes, and 
for corporate and household loans, and that contrarily to the idea that loan developments 
are mainly driven by cyclical and demand factors, during the crisis such supply-side 
effects revealed to be strongly relevant. Indeed, analyzing the period corresponding to the 
Global Financial Crisis, the authors find that liquidity constraints and difficulties to access 
to market funding led banks to restrict lending, while these two variables seem no to be 
                                                          
23 Indeed, the authors show evidence that allows to establish this link between the banks' weak liquidity 
position that leads them to apply for those "lenders of last resort" - and which results in increasing undrawn 
fees - and their exposure to ABCP market 
24 These ﬁndings are robust to bank, firm, and credit line speciﬁc controls and to bank ﬁxed effects. 
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much relevant for credit supply prior to the crisis. In this regard, the authors also find that 
such adjustment on lending was mainly reflected on prices and not so much on volumes. 
 
Finally, as regard the study of how the effect of the Global Financial Crisis may affect 
the real economy through the bank lending channel, we may also refer the works of 
Chodorow-Reich (2014), Cingano et al. (2013) and Bentolila et al. (2013). Differently 
from our research and the ones reported in the lines above, these authors shed light on the 
evolution of credit markets by analyzing how firms have performed depending on the 
banks with which they have a lending relationship. For instance, relying on employment 
data on the US economy and also on loans and banks specific information, Chodorow-
Reich (2014) finds that firms more dependent (prior to the crisis) on lending from banks 
that struggled during the crisis greatly reduced employment as compared to ﬁrms that had 
relationships with healthier ones. In Europe, for the specific case of Italy, Cingano et al. 
(2013) find that firms with lending relationships with banks more exposed to the interbank 
market have experienced a larger drop in investment and employment levels following 
the Global Financial Crisis, while in Spain, Bentolila et al. (2013) find that firms more 
dependent on banks more vulnerable to the crisis (here proxied by the fact they have 
obtained or not assistance from the Government) recorded a larger job destruction than 
other firms. 
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3.2 Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The identification of a credit crunch (here defined as a supply driven reduction on the 
volumes of credit granted and/or an increase in the loan interest rates charged) following 
a crisis with the characteristics of the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 or the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis poses two main methodological challenges which have been addressed in several 
ways in the literature. In this regard, the main studies with focus on the period of the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis are very enlightening and reflect the different approaches followed 
and the differences between them. 
 
The first of the referred challenges derives from the own definition of credit crunch and 
is related with the disentanglement of supply and demand effects on bank lending. Very 
often, crises with a financial, sovereign or banking nature are accompanied by economic 
recession, i.e. they are correlated with a deterioration of the economic conditions. At the 
same time as banks face increasing difficulties to get funding and to guarantee a stable 
and solid financial position as to accomplish, for instance, the regulatory capital ratios, 
firms are negatively impacted for a decreasing demand on their products and recurrently 
decide to cut down their investment plan. Therefore, following the shock, not only banks 
reveal to be less available to grant credit or start to charge higher interest rates, but also 
firms reduce their demand for credit, making it difficult to assess the real effect of the 
shock on credit supply25. Taking into account the importance this identification has, 
namely for policy-makers, in the sense that some monetary policies are more adequate 
than others if the changes in credit markets are demand or supply driven, we may find in 
the literature different approaches proposed to overcome this problem. As described by 
Hempell and Sorensen (2010) and Altunbas et al. (2009), in more traditional studies, 
individual bank-specific characteristics are claimed to be the only ones with directly 
influence in the supply of loans, while demand for loans is commonly assumed to be 
independent of the situation of individual banks and to rather depend on macroeconomic 
factors. Consequently, on the construction of the models used in these studies, there is no 
need to control for demand in order to assess the impact of supply-side factors on bank 
lending. More recently some studies started to use the information collected from the 
                                                          
25 A similar problem arises when following the shock the risk of the firms increase, as the reduction on 
the levels of credit granted is, in that case, attributable to evolution on firms and not on banks. 
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ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS) – or other lending surveys, for the case in which the 
reality under analysis is not the European26. In the context of the Bank Lending Survey, 
every quarter, participating banks provide information on lending standards and credit 
demand from firms. Such figures are then used, respectively, as proxies for unobserved 
supply and demand therefore allowing for the desired disentanglement. Also in response 
to the BLS, banks provide additional, detailed information about the underlying factors 
related to banks’ decision to supply credit and to the related changes in their credit terms 
and conditions for their customers. Hence, this information may be used to identify the 
specific factors driving bank lending. Both the “traditional approach” and this one relying 
on ECB Bank Lending Survey have some limitations. The first one is based on a strong 
and somehow unrealistic assumption that only banks-specific characteristics determine 
credit supply. On the other hand, on the “BLS approach” the quality of the results depends 
on the reliability and the truthfulness of the respondents’ answers. A much better 
methodology, already adopted in some research papers, was introduced by Kwaja and 
Mian (2008). Applicable only when we have available data disaggregated at the bank-
firm level, this approach allows us to more accurately disentangle supply and demand 
factors influencing credit policies. The idea consists, basically, on using firm fixed effects 
which means that we compare for the same firm the volumes of credit granted or the 
interest rates charged by two or more banks that have been affected to a different degree 
by the crisis. As we take the same firm as reference, any differences in the credit provided 
by one bank may only be justified with the conditions of the bank itself. From a different 
perspective, as banks more vulnerable to the shock may lend to a different set of firms, 
the use of firm fixed effects allows to control for firm level demand, firm’s riskiness and, 
very important, for firm unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
The second methodological challenge typically faced by researchers when assessing the 
impact of supply side factors on credit markets in contexts of crises has to do with the 
identification of the degree to which banks were affected by the crisis. Indeed, this 
assessment is very important in order to establish a link between the bank credit supply 
and the shock under analysis and, therefore, to quantify the part of the changes in lending 
policies (for instance, the decrease on loans granted or the increase on loan interest rates) 
                                                          
26 For instance, for the United States, some authors resort to the FED’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
of Bank Lending Practices (e.g. Lown et al., 2000; Basset et al., 2013) 
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that can be effectively attributed to such shock. In order to account for this, and as proxy 
of the bank’s vulnerability, authors have been using both dummy and continuous 
variables. For instance, for the case of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, both Bofondi 
et al. (2013) and Acharya et al. (2015) use the bank’s country of corporation, with 
national banks being identified as more affected. Differently, Popov and van Horen 
(2013) distinguishes affected banks from non-affected banks as the ones being in the top 
half in terms of exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt. For the case of the Financial Crisis of 
2007/2008, both the exposure to interbank markets and the level of securitization activity 
as before the crisis are used by Sette and di Patti (2012), with banks more dependent on 
interbank borrowing and more active in securitization (prior to the crisis) being the most 
vulnerable to the shock. The inclusion of a variable that captures the vulnerability of a 
bank to the shock is needed, however, only when we are using the Kwaja and Mian (2008) 
methodology. In traditional studies as well in those where the supply and demand 
disentanglement is made resorting to the ECB BLS, what we have in general is a variable 
that measures the intensity of the shock. For instance, for the case of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, the spread between the yield on the long-term government bonds of the country 
under analysis and the yield on German Bunds (or a similar one) is commonly used in 
order to measure the tensions in the sovereign markets and to assess how credit supply 
reacts to each percentage point increase or decrease in the such spread.  
 
The approach we follow, the rigor of the model we build and then the quality of the results 
achieved also depend, of course, on the data available for the purposes of the study and, 
more specifically, on the level of data disaggregation. 
In this regard the simplest models we find rely on data aggregated by country. Using the 
information aggregated by member country published by the European Central Bank on 
the interest rates charged on new loans (excluding overdrafts) to non-financial 
corporations as well on residential mortgages (both with initial maturity up to one year), 
Neri (2013) finds evidence that sovereign tensions have had a substantial impact on bank 
lending rates in the peripheral countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), but 
practically none in the core countries (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland). Considering the period from 2003 to 2012, the authors find that 
after one quarter, an increase of 100 basis points in the spread between the yields on 10-
year government bonds and that of swap contracts in euro of equal maturity leads interest 
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rates on loans to non-financial corporations to increase by 33 basis points in Italy, 20 in 
Portugal, 16 in Spain and 7 in Greece. On the other hand, regarding the interest rates on 
loans to households for house purchase, the authors also conclude that an increase on 
sovereign spread negatively impacts the cost of loans with particular relevance on Italy 
(+31 b.p.), Portugal (+16 b.p.) and Spain (+11 b.p.). Interestingly, an opposite, although 
small, effect is found in Greece. By running a counterfactual exercise based on the 
assumption that the spreads would have remained constant at the values recorded in April 
2010, before the heightening of the tensions on Greek bonds (with all other variables 
assumed to follow their actual paths) the author further finds that at the end of 2011 the 
interest rates on new loans to non-financial corporations and residential mortgages in the 
peripheral countries would have averaged respectively 130 and 60 basis points lower than 
their actual values27. Similarly, by relying on a similar kind of aggregated data28, and by 
running a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model, Neri and Ropele 
(2013) provide a quantification of the macroeconomic effects resulting from the tensions 
on the sovereign debt markets (for instance, they test the impact of a 400 b.p. unexpected 
increase in the ten-year Greek spread, which corresponds to the rise in the Greek 
sovereign spread between August and September 2011) and confirm that such tensions 
have led to a significant deterioration in credit access both for firms and households in 
peripheral countries during the crisis period. Regarding the increase on the interest rates 
charged on loans to non-financial corporations, it is estimated to be larger in Portugal and 
Greece (about 40 b.p.) as compared to Spain and Italy (about 20 b.p.), which somehow 
contradicts the results presented above. As for the loans to households similar results are 
reported.  
More advanced works have, however, been developed, relying on data disaggregated at 
the bank level. Albertazzi et al. (2014), using individual data for all Italian banks and also 
using the adjusted BTP-Bund spread as measure of sovereign debt tensions in Italy, take 
conclusions not only on the evolution on bank lending but also on the conditions of 
                                                          
27 For non-financial corporation, in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, respectively, the interest rates would 
have been lower by 130, 50, 150 and 190 b.p. For households, rates would have been 120, 30 and 110 basis 
points lower in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The same opposite effect is found for Greece, as previously. 
28 Namely a balanced panel of 173 monthly macroeconomic variables (151 country-level and 22 euro-area 
wide) pertaining to: bank rates, credit aggregates, monetary aggregates, industrial production, 
unemployment rates, inﬂation rates, intra-EMU exports, conﬁdence indices, and other real and ﬁnancial 
variables. 
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funding and on the performance of banks29. Referring only to the effects on lending 
interest rates, the authors find that changes in the sovereign spread exert a significant 
effect on the interest rates on loans to firms and on mortgages to households, with that 
effect being stronger during the periods of crisis. Quantifying these effects, they show 
that during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis a temporary (one-quarter) 100 b.p. rise 
in the sovereign spread is associated - with a one-quarter lag - with a rise of 50 b.p. and 
30 b.p., respectively, for business loans and households mortgages. On the other hand, a 
similar increase is associated with a reduction of about 1 p.p. of the annual growth for 
loans to households and of 0.7 p.p. for loans to firms. Moreover, by performing some 
“robustness” tests, the authors also find that the impact of the sovereign shock is roughly 
three and two times stronger for the largest banks for the case of loans to firms and loans 
to households, respectively. Comparing the effect depending on the size of the loans, they 
conclude that the impact of an increase in the sovereign spread is bigger for loans over 
€1 million in about 10/20 basis points. Differently from these authors, Del Giovane et al. 
(2013) and Zoli (2013) focus also on the situation of Italy but they use the “BLS 
approach” instead of the “traditional” one to disentangle supply and demand. In this 
regard, by running a system of two simultaneous equations estimated using the two-step 
efficient GMM30, Del Giovane et al. (2013) find evidence of a credit rationing phenomena 
during the period of the Sovereign Debt Crisis as well of the Global Financial Crisis (also 
analyzed in the paper), as banks limit their supply of credit even if the borrowers are 
willing to pay higher margins. Comparing both periods, the authors conclude the effect 
of the supply factors on the cost and availability of credit revealed to be stronger during 
the period of the Sovereign Debt Crisis than in the Global Financial Crisis31. Moreover, 
while during the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 the supply effects on the cost of credit 
were mostly associated with banks’ risk perception, during the sovereign crisis "pure" 
                                                          
29 About the funding costs, the authors find that changes in the sovereign spread exert a significant effect 
on the interest rates on term deposit, repurchase agreements and newly issued bonds but not on the 
remuneration of other instruments such as the households' overnight deposist (which is consistent with the 
common low correlation between this type of interest rates and the current market conditions as well the 
fact they embed a virtually zero risk premium). About the performance of banks, they find that the positive 
effect on the loan-deposit rate differential generally prevails over the negative effect on loan amounts. A 
100 b.p. increase in the sovereign spread is associated with a 2% increase in the net interest income. 
30 Generalized Method of Moments. 
31 The authors estimate a negative cumulative effect (since the beginning of the crisis until the 2Q2012) at 
around 220 basis points (or 2.2 percentage points), of which about a third came during the global crisis and 
two thirds during the sovereign debt crisis. Regarding the growth of loans, demand conditions are estimated 
to have determined a cumulative reduction of about 12 percent. On the other hand, supply factors are  
estimated  to  have  had  a  cumulative  impact  of  more  than  8  percent, with the negative effect attributed 
to credit rationing being estimated on about 4 percent, equally distributed in the two phases of the crisis. 
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supply factors, related to difficulties in the access to funding and to the banks' balance-
sheet position, became predominant. By including in their original model an additional 
variable to assess the impact of changes in the sovereign spreads on credit markets during 
the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the authors further find that a 100 b.p. 
increase in the sovereign spread leads to an immediate 25 b.p increase in the cost of new 
loans (and a cumulative effect of about 30 b.p. after one quarter) and a 0.4 p.p. reduction 
in the quarterly loan growth rate. On the other hand, Zoli (2013) finds evidence that 
changes in sovereign spreads are rapidly transmitted into corporate borrowing cost. For 
instance, by analyzing the situation of Italian banks for the period between January 2006 
and September 2012, the authors conclude that about 30-40 percent of the increase in 
sovereign spreads is transmitted to firm borrowing rates within three months, and 50-60 
percent within six months, with this effect being larger for small loans. Additionally, by 
disentangling supply and demand effects, the author concludes that while supply 
constraints driven by bank funding difficulties at the peak of the Italian sovereign debt 
crisis seem to have prevailed over weak demand until the end of 2011, in 2012 the weak 
demand appears to be the main driver of credit contraction considering the effects of the 
LTRO and other policies implemented by ECB. 
As previously described, the most accurate studies tend to be, however, the ones that rely 
on data disaggregated at the firm-bank level, i.e. micro level data that specifies the lending 
relationships existent between each bank and firm. Three examples of this are the works 
of Bofondi et al. (2013), Acharya et al. (2015) and Popov and van Horen (2013). By 
applying a Difference-in-Difference approach on a sample of 670,000 bank-firm 
relationships involving 567 banks (of which 49 foreign) operating in Italy, following the 
firm-fixed effects methodology from Khwaja and Mian (2008) and distinguishing 
between more and less affected banks according to their country of incorporation, with 
domestic banks being assumed to be more vulnerable to the Sovereign Debt Crisis32, 
Bofondi et al. (2013) find that lending of Italian banks (the most affected banks) grew by 
about 3 percentage points less than that of foreign banks during the period of the 
                                                          
32 Foreign banks operating in Italy are assumed to be the less affected by the crisis because: a) they are 
headquartered in countries where the sovereign risk was more contained; b) their assets portfolio is less 
concentrated in government bonds of peripheral countries, such that the increase in riskiness of their asset 
side due to sovereign risk over the second half of 2011 was relatively milder; and c) although they lend to 
Italian firms, a significant fraction of their liabilities is represented by interbank transfers from their 
headquarters that raise funds either in their home country or in the international wholesale markets, which 
contributed  to a much lower increase in funding cost. 
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Sovereign Debt Crisis. Also, the interest rates charged were 15/20 basis points higher for 
revolving credit lines and term loans, respectively, and about 35 basis points for new 
terms loans. Similar results are found when the authors further apply a model modified 
by the inclusion of a continuous measure of exposure to sovereign risk. Studying all the 
GIIPS countries (and not only Italy) and using as sample all the syndicated loans 
originated by European banks in the period 2006 to 2012, Acharya et al. (2015) – which 
also apply a Difference-in-Difference model, the firm-fixed effects methodology of 
Khwaja and Mian (2008) and the country of incorporation to distinguish more and less 
affected banks – shed some light on the credit supply contraction verified during the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. They do this by showing that firms more dependent on 
GIIPS banks present a kind of behavior typical for financially constrained firms, in the 
sense that they have lower leverage, demonstrate a signiﬁcantly positive propensity to 
save cash out of their cash ﬂows, and increase the fraction of their cash holdings relative 
to bank lines of credit in their liquidity management (moreover, these firms more 
dependent on GIIPS banks have lower levels of investment, lower employment growth 
and lower sales growth as compared to firms with lower GIIPS bank dependence). 
Additionally, in the process to identify what are the relevant bank lending channels 
through which the effects of the sovereign debt crisis are transmitted to the real sector, 
the authors further develop a model to estimate the contraction of lending supply by 
banks, both in terms of volumes and spreads, concluding that during the period of the 
sovereign crisis, the affected banks reduced lending more than non-affected banks by 
more than 35 p.p. and increased spreads in more than 3.6 b.p. Finally, concerning the 
studies that rely on firm-bank disaggregated data, Popov and van Horen (2013) find that 
after the third quarter of 2010, affected banks increased lending by 20% (or above) less 
than non-affected banks, with these results holding when controlling for both time-
varying bank characteristics and for bank fixed effects, as well as after including borrower 
country-quarter fixed effects which control for unobservable borrower demand and/or 
quality at the country level, and industry and firm fixed effects. Differently from the two 
studies previously analyzed, and as already mentioned above, Popov and van Horen 
(2013) distinguish more and less affected banks by taking into account the bank’s 
exposure to sovereign debt securities from GIIPS countries weighted by the respective 
risk.  
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Further studies could be here analyzed also with greater detail. It is the case of De Marco 
(2014) – which shows that European banks more exposed to the sovereign shock 
signiﬁcantly reduced credit supply during the crisis, with a 1% increase in losses-over-
total assets ratio leading to a decrease of the growth rate of domestic loans of about 4/5% 
- Balduzzi et al. (2014) – which is in line with the study developed by Acharya et al. 
(2015), although with some limitations, since it analyzes the effect of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis on real variables as transmitted through the bank lending channel, with the 
vulnerability of the banks to the shock being assessed by their CDS spread – and also 
Ciccarelli et al. (2013) – that by using data aggregated at the country level for 12 euro 
area countries finds that the impact of monetary shocks on gross GDP growth is ampliﬁed 
through the credit channel in countries under sovereign stress. 
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3.3 The specific case of Portugal 
The literature on the effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
on credit supply for the specific case of Portugal is scarce. As we have seen before, there 
are some studies which are focused on the GIIPS and so they approach the situation of all 
the countries included in that group. However, it is difficult to find research focusing 
exclusively on the case of Portugal and doing a deep analysis of on this topic.  
Probably the main exception to this is the work developed by Iyer et al. (2014). Relying 
on bank-firm level data on loans collected from the Central Credit Register (and then 
combined with bank and firm specific variables collected from the Bank of Portugal 
Central Balance Sheet Database), and following the firm-fixed effects methodology of 
Kwaja and Mian (2008) implemented through the estimation of a Difference-in-
Difference econometric model, Iyer et al. (2014) exploit the initial exogenous and 
unexpected shock to the interbank markets verified in August 2007 in order to assess how 
banks operating in Portugal have adjusted their credit lending policies and how such 
adjustment was felt in a different way by borrowers with different characteristics. With 
that purpose, and similarly to Sette and di Patti (2012), the authors also use the banks’ 
dependence on interbank borrowing as a measure of its vulnerability to the shock. By 
following this strategy, the authors find that, on average, a firm that borrows more from 
banks with a higher interbank borrowing ratio prior to the crisis experience a greater 
reduction in credit granted. For instance, a 10% increase in interbank borrowing of the 
lending bank is associated with a 3.7% reduction in the credit available for the firm during 
the crisis period. By including some controls for bank and firm specific characteristics 
before the crisis, the authors also conclude that credit is tightened in a different way 
depending on who lends and who borrows. For instance, banks larger in size are less 
likely to cut credit and smaller firms tend to be more negatively impacted by the credit 
rationing, while for large firms there is no evidence of such credit contraction arising from 
the banks’ exposure to interbank markets. Finally, a last conclusion that deserves here our 
mention is the fact that, on average, firms are not able to perfectly substitute credit supply 
reductions (i.e. they are not able, in general, to borrow from a different bank if their bank 
does not lend to them) neither to substitute bank credit with other sources of financing. 
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Besides the work of Iyer et al. (2014), other papers, namely developed internally by the 
members of the Bank of Portugal, deserve our reference (Farinha and Félix, 2014; 
Antunes and Martinho, 2012; Augusto and Félix, 2014). 
Using a sample of 50.200 observations on credit provided to Portuguese SMEs 
(aggregated by firm) collected from IES (Simplified Business Information) and following 
a disequilibrium model approach through which credit demand and supply equations are 
estimated simultaneously, Farinha and Félix (2014) find that for the period between 2010 
and 2012: a) approximately 15 percent of Portuguese SMEs with bank loans were 
partially rationed, with the most affected firms being the i) younger (26%), ii) very small 
(19%) and ii) operating in the construction sector (21%); b) approximately 32 percent of 
ﬁrms with no bank loans were fully rationed, with the most affected firms being again the 
i) younger (26%) and ii) very small (19%), although the firms of other dimensions are 
also strongly affected (above 20% for all firms, independent of the size)33; and c) banks 
restricted more intensively the supply of loans to firms with higher leverage and less able 
to provide better guarantees. With all these results, Farinha and Félix (2014) show that 
there was indeed a credit tightening in Portuguese economy in the crisis period between 
2010 and 2012 (during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis) and they highlight the firm-
specific characteristics driving credit supply. However, they do not provide any insight 
on the bank specific characteristics that lead banks to reduce lending and, particularly, 
they do not establish any link between the vulnerability of banks to the crisis and their 
supply of credit, which does not allow to clearly quantify the impact of the crisis on the 
bank lending channel. 
Aiming to study the availability of credit to firms in the period following the Global 
Financial Crisis and leading to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Antunes and 
Martinho (2012) apply two different approaches, one based on interest rates and other 
based on the volumes of credit granted. In the first case, the authors build a model that 
relies on June 2010 data as reference to predict the interest rates of October 2011, with 
the actual and observed interest rates at that time being then compared in order to identify 
which part of the changes in observed interest rates can be explained by changes in ﬁrm 
and loan specific characteristics, and which part should be attributed to other factors such 
as credit restrictions, negative business outlook (not explained by changes in ﬁrms’ 
                                                          
33 In this case, all the activity sectors faced credit restriction (with the percentage of affected firms being 
always above 30%). 
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balance sheets), increasing risk aversion, increased costs of ﬁnancing by creditors, 
systemic increases in interest rates and increased costs of capital. Performing this 
exercise, Antunes and Martinho (2012) find evidence that the increase in loan interest 
rates verified between June 2010 and October 2011 is only explained, in a very small part 
(18 in 226 basis points), by the changes on firm and loan characteristics, therefore 
suggesting that there were other factors that induced such increase, for instance, the 
change in the Euribor, the increase in funding costs for banks and the change in banks’ 
behavior towards risk.  
In a different line of research, Augusto and Félix (2014) study how the bank 
recapitalizations that occurred in Portugal between the first quarter of 2010 and the last 
quarter of 2013 have impacted credit supply. In this regard, the authors find that 
government recapitalizations had a positive effect on bank lending, with that effect being 
negatively related with the banks’ capital buffer. Moreover, they find that when lending, 
recapitalized banks did not differentiate firms according to their financial conditions. 
Furthermore, they conclude, by running a sector analysis, that for the specific case of the 
construction and real estate sector companies have benefited from a credit supply increase 
of about 3.5 percent after the government recapitalizations occurred. In summary, through 
this work the authors present some interesting evidence on the effectiveness of 
government interventions on the banking sector.  
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3.4 Summary of Main Literature Review 
 
Table 1: Summary of main Literature Review 
 
  
Author Country Period
Crisis 
event
Level of data 
disaggregation
Methodology 
[Disentanglement 
Supply vs Demand]
Specific Measure of
(1) Exposure to the shock OR
 (2) Intensity of the shock
Sette and di Patti (2012) Italy 2Q2007-4Q2008 GFC Firm-bank level Khwaja and Mian (2008)
(1) Interbank borrowing and 
Securitization activity
Iyer et al.  (2014) Portugal 2Q2007-2Q2009 GFC Firm-bank level Khwaja and Mian (2008) (1) Interbank borrowing
Bord and Santos (2014) US 1Q2005-4Q2007 GFC Firm-bank level Other
(1) Funding raised from "lenders of 
last resort" (Exposure to ABCP 
market)
Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010) 
US 2Q2006-4Q2008 GFC Bank level Traditional approach
(1) Short-term funding and  Exposure 
to
credit-line drawdowns
Kwan (2010) US 1997-2010 GFC Bank level Traditional approach -
Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011)
GIIPS
Core-European
US
1999-2009 GFC Bank level Traditional approach
(1) Securitization activity,  Short-term 
funding and Non-traditional activities
Hempell and Sorensen 
(2010)
GIIPS
Core-European
4Q2002-4Q2009 GFC Country level BLS approach -
Del Giovane et al. 
(2013) 
Italy 4Q2002 - 2Q2012 GFC/SDC Bank level BLS approach (2) Sovereign spread
Bofondi et al.  (2013) Italy 4Q2010-4Q2011 SDC Firm-bank level Khwaja and Mian (2008) (1) Country of Incorporation
Acharya et al.  (2015) GIIPS 2006-2012 SDC Firm-bank level Khwaja and Mian (2008) (1) Country of Incorporation
Popov and van Horen 
(2013) 
European non-
GIIPS countries
3Q2009-4Q2011 SDC Firm-bank level Khwaja and Mian (2008)
(1) Exposure to GIIPS sovereign 
debt
Zoli (2013) Italy 2006-2012 SDC Bank level BLS approach (2) Sovereign spread
Albertazzi et al.  (2014) Italy 1991-2011 SDC Bank level Traditional approach (2) Sovereign spread
Neri (2013)
GIIPS
Core-European
2003-2012 SDC Country level Traditional approach (2) Sovereign spread
Neri and Ropele (2013) 
GIIPS
Core-European
2007-2012 SDC Country level Traditional approach (2) Sovereign spread
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4. Empirical Study: the specific case of Portugal 
Once we have reviewed the main literature, it is the purpose of this section to assess, for 
the specific case of Portugal, if following the Global Financial Crisis and/or the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis banks operating in Portugal reduced lending and a credit crunch 
took place, therefore impacting the real economy.  
4.1 Identification Issues 
As we have already mentioned, the identification of a credit crunch as result of a crisis 
with the characteristics of the Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 or the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis poses some challenges, namely related to the disentanglement of supply and 
demand effects, and also the identification of the degree to which banks were affected by 
the crisis in order to establish a causal effect between the shock under analysis and credit 
supply and, therefore, to quantify which changes in lending policies can be effectively 
attributed to such shock. 
On the disentanglement of the supply and demand effects on bank lending, we follow the 
methodology first implemented by Khwaja and Mian (2008). Relying on data from the 
Portuguese Central Credit Register and collected by the Bank of Portugal, which contains 
detailed information about each loan provided by all banks operating in Portugal to non-
financial corporations, we are able to compare exactly for the same firm the evolution of 
credit supplied by two or more banks that have been affected to a different degree by the 
Global Financial Crisis or the Sovereign Debt Crisis, depending on the case under 
analysis. Therefore, by running a regression with firm-fixed effects, we have the 
possibility to isolate the effect of supply factors on bank lending, expurgating from our 
analysis the possible decrease in the volumes of credit granted arising from a reduction 
of the demand induced by the deterioration of economic conditions in the context of the 
crisis. Moreover, by using always the same firm and exploiting the fact it holds a lending 
relationship with two or more banks with different exposure to the shock, we can also 
account for the fact that banks more exposed to the crisis could lend to a different set of 
firms. Indeed, in the limit, if the portfolio of clients from one group and the other was 
completely different, we could not develop a comparable analysis in such straight way. 
In summary, by following this approach, as we control for firm level demand, firm’s 
riskiness and firm unobserved heterogeneity, we ensure that any differences verified in 
lending are only due to differences on the supply side. 
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As regarding the assessment of the degree to which banks were affected by the crisis, the 
measure that we use as proxy of their vulnerability to the shocks is different according to 
the specific period under analysis. For the case of the Global Financial Crisis, we use the 
level of Interbank Borrowing prior to the crisis measured as the ratio of total borrowing 
from other banks to total assets. As an alternative measure we could use, for instance, the 
level of securitization activity. However, once the Portuguese banking system was not 
particularly active on that kind of markets (as they were banks in US but also in Spain), 
but instead it seems to have been impacted by the general freezing on the interbank 
markets, it is our understanding that the selected measure captures in a better way the 
effect that the Global Financial Crisis had, in fact, in the capacity of Portuguese banks to 
lend credit. On the other hand, for the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, we 
use as proxy of their vulnerability the exposure of each bank to sovereign markets prior 
to the crisis, measured by the amount of sovereign debt hold in their balance sheet. We 
do not include in this case only the holdings of sovereign debt from GIIPS countries, 
however, it is our belief that this has no implication for the results obtained since the great 
majority of the sovereign debt hold by the Portuguese banks is from the own Portuguese 
government and also from other GIIPS countries. 
An additional identification issue not yet discussed has to do with the fact that the shock 
analyzed has to be exogenous with respect to the situation of Portuguese banking system. 
This condition is verified both for the period of the Global Financial Crisis and the period 
of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. For instance, in the first case, we exploit an 
exogenous and not predicted shock coming from the interbank market and started in 
August 2007, when due to the lack of confidence within the system banks stopped lending 
each other, the market froze and interbank loan spreads increased in a significant 
magnitude, such that banks (in general, and also in Portugal) found more difficult to get 
liquidity and the cost of funding increased. On the other hand, in the case of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, the shock is also exogenous once the increase verified in 
Portuguese sovereign spreads was not motivated, like in other countries such as Spain 
and Ireland, by a deterioration of the financial conditions of domestic banks such that it 
was required a public intervention at a large scale. Indeed, in spite of the cases of BPN 
and BPP, the rise on Portuguese sovereign spreads was mainly related with the weakness 
of Portuguese public accounts (high levels of public debt and successive deficits), which 
was reinforced by the contagion on sovereign markets following the Greek crisis and led, 
45 
 
in fact, the Portuguese government to ask for bailout in April 2011 and to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB 
that predicted the adoption of several measures, many of them with direct consequences 
on the banking system. 
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4.2 Empirical Strategy (Baseline Model) 
In order to quantify the effect of the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis on credit supply in Portugal we estimate two similar models where the 
independent variable captures the lending relationship for a firm-bank pair both prior and 
during the crisis, and then replicates that for several firm-bank pairs, allowing to measure 
the differences on credit policies applied by banks with different exposure to the shock. 
In other words, we use a difference-in-difference approach where the change in the (log) 
credit granted by a given bank to a certain firm is the independent variable, and where the 
main explanatory variable is a measure of the bank’s vulnerability to the crisis under 
analysis (being different depending on which of the two crises we are analyzing). In its 
simplest version our baseline model is defined as follows: 
Global Financial Crisis:              ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝜀 (1a) 
Sovereign Debt Crisis:                ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝜀 (1b) 
In equation (1a) the independent variable (∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠)) is defined as the change in the log 
level of committed credit volume for each firm-bank pair between 2Q2007 and 2Q2009, 
while in equation (1b) a similar definition applies but instead for the period between 
1Q2011 and 4Q2012. On the other hand, in equation (1a) the exposure of banks to the 
Global Financial Crisis (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔) is measured by the ratio of total borrowing 
from other banks to total assets as of 2Q2007 (so, immediately prior to the crisis). In 
equation (1b) the log amount of sovereign debt held in the balance sheet as of 1Q2011 
(𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒) is used as proxy for the banks’ vulnerability to the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Considering all the advantages already exposed, we improve the model by following the 
methodology of Khwaja and Mian (2008), i.e. we include firm fixed effects (in the model 
below, ϴ) in order to control for firm level demand, firm’s riskiness and firm unobserved 
heterogeneity. This allow us to exploit the multiple relationships that several firms hold 
with banks in order to assess if those banks cut back credit in a different magnitude 
depending on the extent they were affected by the crisis. 
Global Financial Crisis:   ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2. 𝜃 +  𝜀  (2a) 
Sovereign Debt Crisis:     ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝜃 +  𝜀  (2b) 
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We further improve our model through the inclusion of a set of bank specific variables. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is defined as the log of Total Assets. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 is measured as the ratio of 
Short-Term Assets to Total Assets. For 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 we use the ratio of Equity to Total 
Assets. To measure 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 we consider the Return on Assets (Net 
Income/Total Assets). Finally, as regarding the 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 we take as reference the ratio of 
impaired loans to Total Assets. For the period of the Sovereign Debt Crisis we include an 
additional variable, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, which corresponds to the Loan-to-Deposits ratio. 
Global Financial Crisis:   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =   𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +
       𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿+ 𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
(3a) 
 
Sovereign Debt Crisis:   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +
       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +
       𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
       𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
(3b) 
In next subsections alternative specifications of this baseline model are also employed to 
run complementary tests. To perform the great majority of those tests we just divide the 
sample according to a specific criteria (e.g. 5 largest banks vs Others banks; Exporting vs 
Non Exporting Firms). However, additional variables are also considered, for instance, 
firm-specific variables. For a deeper analysis we use, therefore, three different measures 
intended to account for the dimension of the firm: 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠), defined as the log of 
Total Assets; 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟), defined as the log of Total Revenues; and 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠), defined as the log of the number of employees. We also use 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 taking into consideration the date of incorporation of the firm. For 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
we take the ratio of Debt to Total Assets. Finally, for the 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 we 
consider the relation between operating profits and interest expenses, while for 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 we take the ratio of profits to Total Assets. All bank and firm specific 
variables are considered as of December 2006, or as of December 2010, depending if we 
are carrying out our study for the period of the Global Financial Crisis or for the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis.   
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4.3 Data 
For the purposes of our empirical research we rely on loan confidential data from the 
Portuguese Central Credit Register. The Central Credit Register is a database with 
information collected by the Bank of Portugal on all loans above 50 Euros granted by 
banks operating in Portugal both to non-financial corporations and households. This data 
is available at monthly frequency and contains detailed information on bank-firm lending 
relationships. For instance, it contains information both on granted and drawn amounts 
(amounts outstanding at the end of each month) as well other loan specific information 
such as the original and residual maturities, the type/purpose of the loan or the existence 
of collateral and personal guarantees. 
For bank-specific information, we rely on two different sources. For the period of the 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 we use bank balance-sheet variables also compiled by the 
Bank of Portugal, while for the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis we rely on 
the same information provided by the APB - Portuguese Banking Association. In this case 
we only have data available for 33 banks, which we believe that does not significantly 
impact the results obtained as they include most Portuguese banks and foreign banks 
operating in Portugal and represent around 96% of the assets in the banking system.  
Finally, for firm-specific information we rely on data recorded by the Central Balance-
Sheet Database from the Bank of Portugal. This database contains information on main 
financial variables as well on other quantitative and qualitative data such as the number 
of employees or the industry in which it develops its main activity. 
For the analysis developed on the period of the Global Financial Crisis we compute the 
difference on credit granted between the 2Q2007 and the 2Q2009. Bank and firm specific 
information is collected as of December 2006 (prior to the crisis). For the analysis on the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis we compute the difference on credit granted between the 
1Q2011 and the 4Q2012. We therefore exploit the reaction of banks operating in Portugal 
during the most acute stage of the crisis, and following the request for bailout from the 
Portuguese Government. Bank and firm specific information is collected as of December 
2010 (prior to the sovereign shock). In both cases we restrict our sample to lending 
relationships established with firms that borrow from at least 2 different banks. 
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4.4 Main Results 
4.4.1 Credit supply in Portugal during the Global Financial Crisis 
The results from the estimation of equations (1a) to (3a) of our baseline model are 
presented in Table 2.  
In Column 1 we regress our model in the simplest version, i.e. considering the change in 
our independent variable – the log level of committed credit volume for each firm-bank 
pair between 2Q2007 and 2Q2009 - as explained only by the level of Interbank 
Borrowing. The results strongly suggest that banks more dependent on funding from 
interbank markets prior to the crisis have reduced lending more than other banks. Indeed, 
the coefficient of the 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔  variable is statistically significant (at the level 
of 1%) and indicates that an additional bank’s dependence of 1% from interbank 
borrowing leads to a reduction in credit supply of almost 0.6%. 
In Column 2 we regress our baseline model improved through the inclusion of firm-fixed 
effects. As we have already seen, crises like the Global Financial Crisis tend to have 
associated a deterioration of economic conditions and, therefore, a reduction of credit 
demand. Moreover, it is possible that banks with different exposure to the shock (as 
proxied by their reliance on interbank funding) have also a different portfolio of clients, 
then lending to firms, for instance, with a higher or lower credit risk. In order to control 
for this, by including firm fixed effects we are able to compare the evolution of credit 
supplied exactly to the same firm, comparing banks with different exposure to the 
interbank market, and thus capturing only the effects on lending volumes coming from 
the supply side. Similarly to the results presented before, the results reported on Column 
2 also suggest that banks which borrowed more from other banks prior to the crisis have 
reduced credit at a larger scale. In this case, the coefficient for the explanatory variable 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 is even bigger, indicating that the impact of a 1% increase in 
interbank borrowing is stronger and equivalent to a decrease on bank lending above the 
0.62%. 
Finally, in Column 3, we run our most complete version of the baseline model, which 
includes several controls for bank-specific characteristics in addition to the explanatory 
variable 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔. All the new variables are statistically significant, meaning 
they are useful to explain differences in the evolution of credit supply during the period 
of the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, the main question is what is the sign of their 
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coefficients and what do they indicate. According to the traditional literature large, liquid 
and well capitalized banks, as well as banks with a higher profitability, were expected to 
react less negatively to the crisis and not to reduce lending in the same magnitude as other 
banks. On the other hand, banks with a less incidence of non-performing loans were also 
expected to be more resilient, with that being reflected in a lower reduction on credit 
available for firms. Considering the results reported on Column 3, we may say that some 
of our estimates are surprising from the perspective of the traditional literature. As 
expected, we find that larger banks and more liquid banks are less prone to reduce lending, 
which is compatible with the traditional idea that they may have access to alternative 
sources of funding (besides the interbank market) and that the share of liquid assets which 
they hold work as a buffer if they need to expand credit. Moreover, we find that banks 
with a higher Return on Assets are also less likely to cut credit (a higher ROA may result 
in higher retained earnings and hence additional capital both to support and to fund bank 
lending; additionally, it may also lead to a higher risk tolerance and, so, on the easing of 
lending standards), with a small increase in profitability having apparently a very positive 
impact on credit supply. Notwithstanding, as regarding bank capitalization and the 
incidence of non-performing loans our results do not confirm the expectations. For the 
first case, according to the traditional literature we would expect that banks with higher 
levels of capital would reduce credit supply by less than other banks as capital works as 
a buffer to compensate for adverse shocks. Our results, however, suggest that it has 
happened exactly the opposite, which according to Kwan (2010) may be explained with 
the fact that a bank’s capital position also reflects its risk aversion, and more risk-averse 
banks tend to be even more selective when lending during a period of crisis. For the case 
of non-performing loans, our results also contradict the theory that positively relates the 
quality of a portfolio of loans with credit supply. As explained by Kwan (2010), banks 
who present a higher ratio of non-performing loans tend to be pressured by supervisory 
authorities to deleverage and they face additional capital constraints due to higher 
provisioning for loan losses in the future. Moreover, banks which have a higher incidence 
of bad loans, after taking into account their bad portfolio outcomes tend to review and 
turn more restrictive their lending strategy. In spite of all this, during the period of the 
Global Financial Crisis these effects seem to have been overturned, and banks with higher 
ratios of bad loans did not cut back credit as much as the other banks, which may be 
possible explained with the adoption of a loan evergreening behavior from these 
institutions (Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; Iyer et al., 2014). In line with the results 
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obtained for previous regressions, the results presented in Column 3 also show evidence 
that banks more dependent on interbank markets prior to the crisis have reduced their 
credit supply more significantly, with an additional bank’s dependence of 1% from 
interbank borrowing leading to a reduction in credit supply of approximately 0.37%. 
 
After improving our model through the inclusion of bank specific variables, we now run 
two additional regressions which allows us to better understand if and how the dry up in 
the interbank market has affected different classes of banks. 
The first test we perform is intended to understand if there was any difference in the credit 
policies followed by the five largest banks (ranked by the assets) operating in Portugal in 
comparison with the remaining banks. Indeed, as there are differences between the two 
groups both in terms of balance-sheet characteristics as well as business models and 
lending strategies, we expect they have reacted differently to the developments in the 
interbank market. In order to perform this test, we follow a straight methodology: we first 
divide our sample in two, taking into account the banks that belong to one group or the 
other, and then regress our model separately for both samples. As reported in Table 3, our 
results suggest that among the five largest banks a 1% increase in interbank borrowing 
results in a decrease on bank lending of 0.36%, while for the remaining banks the same 
increase in the dependence on interbank markets leads to a decrease in credit supply of 
about 0.34%. This means that the impact of interbank borrowing was important for both 
classes of banks, but slightly more significant for the group of the five largest banks. As 
regarding the other bank-specific variables we find, for both groups, that banks with a 
higher share of liquid assets, more profitable and with a higher incidence of bad loans are 
less prone to reduce lending, exactly has we have concluded from previous estimations. 
Moreover, we find that bank size is not statistically significant for the group of smaller 
banks, while for the group of the largest five banks it seems to be negatively related with 
credit supply (although the effect is small). Finally, as regarding bank capital, among the 
largest five banks the results continue to suggest that better capitalized banks reduce credit 
supply more than other banks (giving support to the thesis that higher levels of bank 
capital reflect a higher risk-aversion). For the remaining banks operating in Portugal, bank 
capital seems to be positively correlated with credit supply, confirming the predictions of 
the traditional literature. 
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We also perform a very similar test but dividing our sample in domestic banks and foreign 
branches and subsidiaries. The idea here is to analyze if the reliance on interbank market 
impacts differently the supply of credit of banks incorporated in Portugal comparing with 
other banks that operate in Portugal but are an extension in here of a foreign banking 
group. Interestingly, we find that while among domestic banks a 1% increase in interbank 
borrowing leads to a decrease in credit supply of about 0.38%, the effect among foreign 
branches and subsidiaries has exactly of the same dimension but on the opposite direction 
(Table 4). 
 
After studying how a higher vulnerability to the Global Financial Crisis have differently 
impacted credit supply among different classes of banks, we now turn our attention to the 
side of the firms in order to clarify if and how the reduction on bank lending affected all 
them in a similar way. With that purpose we start by running a model similar to the one 
defined in equation (2a) but to which we add interaction effects between interbank 
borrowing and firm specific variables. As mentioned in a previous section, we use three 
different measures which account for the dimension of the firm based on its Assets, 
Turnover and Employees. We also use a measure for the firm age, and additional 
measures intended to identify if banks tightened credit in a large scale depending on the 
firm’s leverage, profitability and interest coverage ratio. 
Results for these regressions are presented in Table 5. As illustrated in Columns 1, 2 and 
3 the impact of the dry up in the interbank market on credit supply was passed at a large 
scale to smaller firms, independently of our measure to take into account the assets, the 
revenues or the number of employees. Similarly, firms with a shorter period of activity 
were also the most affected in the context of the credit crunch occurred during the period 
of the Global Financial Crisis, as reported in Column 4. Additionally, the coefficients for 
the other three variables – Columns 5, 6 and 7 – suggest that firms with a higher leverage, 
a lower capacity to repay debt (i.e. a higher interest coverage ratio as measured by the 
Interest Expenses over the Profits) and more profitable were not the ones to which banks 
reduced credit supply more significantly. Although this could be explained with the fact 
that banks support firms with increasing difficulties in order to reduce potential loan 
defaults (Iyer et al., 2014), the true is that according to our estimations these coefficients 
are not statistically significant, thus suggesting (even if we may consider that strange) that 
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these variables were not relevant during the transmission of the liquidity shock on 
interbank markets. 
 
To further strength our analysis as regarding the effects of this credit crunch among firms 
with different characteristics, we run three additional tests, using again the methodology 
of dividing the sample in two (or more) subsamples and regress our model for those 
subsamples separately. 
In the first of these three tests, we divide our sample in Micro & Small Firms, Medium 
Size Firms and Big firms. We use the definition proposed by the European Commission 
and so, we consider as: (i) Micro & Small Firm a company with less than 50 employees 
and with a turnover or a balance sheet that does not exceeds the 10 million Euros; (ii) 
Medium Size Firm a company with less than 250 employees and with a turnover that does 
not exceeds the 50 million Euros or a balance sheet that does not exceeds the 43 million 
Euros, and which does not fulfill the criteria previously defined for Micro & Small Firm; 
and (iii) Big Firm a company that does not fulfill any of the two criteria previously 
defined. Results are reported in Table 6 and in accordance to our previous findings 
suggest that the magnitude of the credit tightening arising from the shock on interbank 
market was higher for smaller firms. Indeed, while for Big Firms a 1% increase in 
interbank borrowing results in a decrease on bank lending of approximately 0.36%, for 
Medium Size Firms the effect is estimated in 0.38% and for Micro&Small Firms in 
0.40%. These results are therefore an additional evidence of the financing problems faced 
by SMEs in Portugal in the last years. 
For our second test we divide the sample in exporting and non-exporting firms. We 
believe that in general the higher capacity to export is seen as an (additional) indicator of 
the quality and the strength of the company, such that we expect to find a lower exposure 
of these firms to the credit crunch occurred during the period of the Global Financial 
Crisis. For this purposes, we follow the rule defined by the Bank of Portugal and classify 
a company as an exporting firm if at least 50% of its Revenues correspond to exports, or 
at least 10% in the cases when the value of exports is equal or exceeds the 150 thousand 
Euros. Results are reported in Table 7 and confirm our expectations, although we do not 
find such a significant difference among the two kinds of firms. Indeed, for Non-
Exporting Firms a 1% increase in interbank borrowing results in a decrease on bank 
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lending of approximately 0.38% while for Exporting Firms the decrease is lower, 
corresponding to approximately 0.34%. 
Finally, considering that the Global Financial Crisis was associated to problems in the 
subprime sector, and with repercussions in all real estate market and also on the 
construction industry, and considering the problems faced since then by Portuguese 
companies operating on such sectors, we test to which extent credit supply was reduced 
in a larger extent to those firms but we find no significant evidence of that (Table 8). 
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4.4.2 Credit supply in Portugal during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The results from the estimation of equations (1b) to (3b) of our baseline model are 
presented in Table 9.  
Similarly to what we have done for the period of the Global Financial Crisis we start by 
running our baseline model in its simplest version and, then, we regress its improved 
version through the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. According to the estimates for these 
two versions of the baseline model (Columns 1 and 2), banks more exposed to sovereign 
debt do not seem to have reduced credit supply more than did the other banks. Indeed, in 
the first case, the coefficient of our main explanatory variable – which captures the banks’ 
vulnerability to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis – is not even statistically significant. 
On the other hand, in the second case, the coefficient is positive suggesting an effect 
exactly the opposite we would expect. 
When we further improve the model by including additional bank-specific variables 
(Column 3) we arrive to different conclusions. Specifically regarding the coefficient of 
the variable 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 it turns negative, being statistically significant at the 1% 
level. For a 1% increase in the sovereign debt exposure we find that banks decrease credit 
supply by approximately 0.05%. Therefore, and according to our expectations, we find 
evidence that banks more exposed to the Sovereign Debt Crisis have reduced lending 
more than other banks. Regarding the significance and the information contained on the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables we have that - as we have also found for 
the period of the Global Financial Crisis – large and more profitable banks react less 
negatively to the sovereign shock and do not reduce lending in the same magnitude of 
other banks. Differently, however, we find there is a negative correlation between credit 
supply and the variables related to liquidity and the incidence of non-performing loans. 
On this last variable, the results are in accordance with the traditional literature as banks 
with a portfolio of loans of lower quality are expected to reduce lending more than other 
banks since they suffer the pressure of supervisory authorities to deleverage and they face 
additional capital constraints due to higher provisioning for loan losses in the future. 
Finally, regarding the variables related with bank capitalization and leverage we find that 
the first is not statistically significantly while the second is economically significant, 
therefore suggesting they do not explain any differences in bank lending. 
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In order to complement our analysis on the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
we further perform two additional tests. For instance, and exactly as we have done during 
our analysis on the period of the Global Financial Crisis, we test whether the effect of an 
additional exposure to the Sovereign Debt Crisis was transmitted to the supply of credit 
in a different way among the five largest banks operating in Portugal and among the 
domestic banks (Table 10).  
For the first case, our results do not indicate that among the five largest banks the effect 
of a higher exposure to the sovereign debt has impacted credit supply in a scale larger 
than the one we find when considering the full sample. For instance, in this regard we 
find that a 1% increase in sovereign debt exposure leads to a decrease in credit supply of 
about 0.057%, which compares with the 0.055% effect we found when analyzing the 
entire sample. A possible explanation for this has to do with the fact that a huge part of 
our observations correspond exactly to observations for these five largest banks. 
Regarding the second test, the results suggest that the transmission of the sovereign debt 
shock was significantly more intense among the domestic banks. Indeed, among such 
class of banks we find that a 1% increase in sovereign debt exposure leads to a decrease 
in credit supply of about 0.24%.  
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5. Research in progress 
Looking to improve our research for publishing purposes, we are currently collecting 
additional data which will allow us to run in near time new complementary analysis as 
well to improve some of the analysis already performed and presented in here. All the 
methodology to follow and the new models to run were already defined (and are presented 
below), now depending just on the collection of the respective data. 
The main lines of investigation under current research are the following: A) 
Heterogeneity in the transmission of the sovereign shock on credit supplied to firms; B.1) 
The effect of the liquidity shock in interbank markets on the supply of short term loans 
vs medium and long term loans; B.2) The effect of the sovereign debt shock on the supply 
of short term loans vs medium and long term loans; C.1) The evolution of loan interest 
rates charged by banks with different exposure to the Global Financial Crisis; C.2) The 
evolution of loan interest rates charged by banks with different exposure to the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
A) Heterogeneity in the transmission of the sovereign shock on credit supplied to 
firms 
i) Accounting for Firm specific variables 
a. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠). 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝜃 +
 𝜀 
 
b. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟). 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +
𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
 
c. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠). 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +
𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
 
d. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
 
e. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
 
 
f. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +
𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀 
 
g. ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3. 𝜃 +
 𝜀 
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, where: 
 ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) – Change in the log level of committed credit volume for each firm-bank pair 
between 1Q2011 and 4Q2012; 
 Sov. Debt Exposure - ln(Exposure to GIIPS Sovereign Debt), as of 1Q2011; 
 Firm Size (Assets) - ln(Total Assets), as of December 2010; 
 Firm Size (Turnover) - ln(Sales+Services), as of December 2010; 
 Firm Size (Employees) - ln(#employees), as of December 2010; 
 Firm Age – ln(1+Age), as of December 2010; 
 Firm Leverage - Debt/Equity, as of December 2010; 
 Firm Interest Coverage –Interest Expenses/Total Profits, as of December 2010; 
 Firm Profitability – Total Profits/Assets, as of December 2010; 
 ϴ - firm fixed effects. 
 
ii) Micro&Small Firms vs Medium Size Firms vs Big firms 
𝑎)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF MICRO&SMALL FIRM 
 
𝑏)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 
 
𝑐)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF BIG GIRM 
 
iii) Exporting Firm vs Non-Exporting Firm 
𝑎)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF EXPORTING FIRM 
 
𝑏)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF NON-EXPORTING                            
 
 
iv) Construction and Real Estate Sectors 
𝑎)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF CAE 41, 42, 43 
 
𝑏)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF CAE 68 
59 
 
B.1) The effect of the sovereign debt shock on the supply of short term loans vs 
medium and long term loans 
𝑎)  ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =   𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿+ 𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  
      IF SHORT-TERM LOAN 
 
𝑏)  ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =   𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 +        𝛽2𝑎 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿+ 𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  
      IF MEDIUM AND LONG TERM LOAN 
 
 
B.2) The effect of the sovereign debt shock on the supply of short term loans vs 
medium and long term loans 
𝑎)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF SHORT-TERM LOAN 
 
𝑏)   ∆ ln(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) =     𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 +       𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 +        𝛽2𝑑. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +        𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
       𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝛽3. 𝜃 +  𝜀  IF MEDIUM AND LONG TERM LOAN 
 
C.1) The evolution of loan interest rates charged by banks with different exposure 
to the Global Financial Crisis 
𝑎) ∆ (𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑏) ∆ (𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑐) ∆ (𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑑) ∆ (𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑒) ∆ (𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑓) ∆ (𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
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, where: 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
bank on short-term loans (maturity up to 12 months) up to €1 million between 2Q2007 and 
2Q2009; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each bank 
on short-term loans (maturity up to 12 months) above €1 million between 2Q2007 and 
2Q2009; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
bank on medium-term loans (maturity between 1 and 5 years) up to €1million between 
2Q2007 and 2Q2009; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each bank 
on medium-term loans (maturity between 1 and 5 years) above €1 million between 2Q2007 
and 2Q2009; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
bank on long-term loans (maturity over 5 years) up to €1 million, between 2Q2007 and 
2Q2009; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each bank 
on long-term loans (maturity over 5 years) above €1 million, between 2Q2007 and 2Q2009; 
 Interbank Borrowing - Ratio  of  total  interbank borrowing, as of 2Q2007; 
 Bank Size - ln(Total Assets), as of 2Q2009; 
 Bank Liquidity – Short term assets/Total assets, as of 2Q2007; 
 Bank Capital –Equity/Total Assets, as of 2Q2007; 
 Bank Leverage - Debt/Total Assets, as of 1Q2007; 
 Bank Profitability – ROA (Net Income/Total Assets), as of 2Q2007; 
 Bank NPL – Impaired Loans/Total Assets, as of 2Q2007; 
 
C.2) The evolution of loan interest rates charged by banks with different exposure 
to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
𝑎) ∆ (𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑏)∆ (𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
 
𝑐) ∆ (𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑑) ∆ (𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑒) ∆ (𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
𝑓) ∆ (𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) =  𝛽1. 𝑆𝑜𝑣. 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑎. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽2𝑐 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑑 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑒 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑓 . 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑁𝑃𝐿 +  𝜀  
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, where: 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
banks on short-term loans (maturity up to 12 months) up to €1 million between 1Q2011 and 
4Q2012; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each banks 
on short-term loans (maturity up to 12 months) above €1 million between 1Q2011 and 
4Q2012; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
banks on medium-term loans (maturity between 1 and 5 years) up to €1million between 
1Q2011 and 4Q2012; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝑀𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each banks 
on medium-term loans (maturity between 1 and 5 years) above €1 million between 1Q2011 
and 4Q2012; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each 
banks on long-term loans (maturity over 5 years) up to €1 million, between 1Q2011 and 
4Q2012; 
 ∆(𝑖_𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑖𝑔) – Change in the average (percentage) interest rate charged by each banks 
on long-term loans (maturity over 5 years) above €1 million, between 1Q2011 and 4Q2012; 
 Sov. Debt Exposure - ln(Exposure to GIIPS Sovereign Debt), as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank Size - ln(Total Assets), as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank Liquidity – Short term assets/Total assets, as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank Capital –Equity/Total Assets, as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank leverage - Debt/Total Assets, as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank Profitability – ROA (Net Income/Total Assets), as of 1Q2011; 
 Bank NPL – Impaired Loans/Total Assets, as of 1Q2011; 
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6. Main Conclusions and Further Research 
In this paper we study the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis on the lending activity of banks operating in Portugal. With that 
purpose we analyze whether some banks, more vulnerable to such crises, have behaved 
differently from other banks in the sense they cut back credit at a larger scale. In order to 
identify the vulnerability of a bank to each one of the crisis, we use two different 
measures. For the period of the Global Financial Crisis we take into account the ratio of 
interbank borrowing. For the period of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis we use the 
exposure to the sovereign market as measured by the amount of sovereign debt hold in 
the balance sheet. Additionally, to disentangle the effects of supply and demand factors 
on credit developments we follow the firm-fixed effects approach introduced by Khwaja 
and Mian (2008), which means that we compare exactly for the same firm the volumes 
of credit granted by two or more banks that have been affected to a different degree by 
the crisis. 
To perform this analysis we rely on loan confidential data from the Portuguese Central 
Credit Register. This detailed information on bank-firm lending relationships is also 
combined with bank and firm specific information. 
Main results suggest that following the Global Financial Crisis and the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, banks more vulnerable to such crises have reduced lending more 
than other banks. Regarding the period of the Global Financial Crisis, we find that an 
additional bank’s dependence of 1% from interbank borrowing leads to a reduction in 
credit supply of approximately 0.37%, after controlling for bank specific variables. 
Moreover, we find that larger banks, more liquid banks and more profitable banks are less 
prone to reduce lending while banks with a higher level of capital and a higher incidence 
of non-performing are more likely to do that, with that reflecting their risk-aversion and 
propensity to loan evergreening. Additionally, we find that the negative effect of 
Interbank Borrowing in credit supply is higher among the five largest banks. Exploiting 
the magnitude of these effects as depending on firm specific characteristics, we also find 
that the impact of the dry up in the interbank market on credit supply was passed at a large 
scale to smaller firms, as well to the younger ones, while the reduction in lending was 
less significant for exporting companies. Regarding the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
we find that a 1% increase in the sovereign debt exposure leads banks to decrease credit 
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supply by approximately 0.05%. Similarly to our findings for the period of the Global 
Financial Crisis, we also conclude that large and more profitable banks react less 
negatively to the sovereign shock and do not reduce lending in the same magnitude of 
other banks. Additionally to this, our results suggest that the transmission of the sovereign 
debt shock was significantly more intense among the domestic banks. Indeed, among such 
class of banks we find that a 1% increase in sovereign debt exposure leads to a decrease 
in credit supply of about 0.24%.  
 
Concerning the recent developments on credit markets, and considering the only recent 
attention granted to the issue, several topics still to be investigated, therefore representing 
an interesting line for future research. For instance, regarding the specific case of 
Portugal, it could be interesting to investigate how credit supply reacted to the main 
measures introduced by the European Central Bank. Indeed, one of the main problems of 
the monetary policy followed in the Euro-Area is that due to the fragmentation of the 
market “one size does not fit all”, i.e. the same measure may not be effective for all its 
members. Another interesting topic for research would be to study the transmission (both 
in terms of dimension and time lag) of funding costs to credit granted and interest rates 
charged. Additionally, and similarly to the study developed by Acharya et al. (2015), it 
could be interesting to measure the impact of the dry up in the interbank market and the 
sovereign debt shock on real variables (GDP growth, employment, investment, etc) as 
transmitted through the bank lending channel. Finally, a study similar to ours could be 
performed also for the case of credit supplied to households. 
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8. Annex: Tables 
Table 2: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Baseline Model 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Interbank borrowing  -0.5874613
***
-0.6233045
***
-0.3715585
***
(0.0102387) (0.0124806) (0.0171625)
Bank size 0.0702364
***
(0.0022786) 
Bank liquidity  0.3370019
***
(0.0370624) 
Bank capital -0.5427315
***
(0.1376231) 
Bank profitability  11.25613
***
(1.459048)
Bank NPL  3.672901
***
(0.2491215)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Number of observations 218.024 218.024 217.982
Adjusted R2 0.0149 0.0149 0.0238
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 3: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | 5 Largest Banks vs Other 
Banks 
 
  
All banks 5 largest banks Other banks
Interbank borrowing -0.3715585
***
-0.3621666
***
-0.3448688
***
(0.0171625) (0.0177851 ) (0.1290718)
Bank size 0.0702364
***
-0.0737118
***
-0.012015
(0.0022786) (0.0024422) (0.0174155) 
Bank liquidity  0.3370019
***
 0.351447
***
1.054429
***
(0.0370624) (0.0383735) (0.2817802) 
Bank capital -0.5427315
***
  -0.5391061
***
4.737485
***
(0.1376231) (0.1415428) (1.231249) 
Bank profitability  11.25613
***
11.27755
***
 40.50616
***
(1.459048) (1.491173) (13.79235)
Bank NPL  3.672901
***
3.536379
***
14.11021
***
(0.2491215) (0.2540007) (2.730016)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 217.982 204.474 13.508
Adjusted R2 0.0238 0.0247 0.0097
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 4: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Domestic vs Non Domestic 
Banks 
 
  
All banks Domestic Banks Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries
Interbank borrowing -0.3715585
***
-0.3871809
***
0.3874268
***
(0.0171625) (0.0177851 ) (0.1290718)
Bank size 0.0702364
***
.06268
***
0.2014643
(0.0022786) (0.0024422) (0.0174155) 
Bank liquidity  0.3370019
***
 0.2221883 
***
0.6244119
***
(0.0370624) (0.0383735) (0.2817802) 
Bank capital -0.5427315
***
 -0.4602786
***
 1.922311
***
(0.1376231) (0.1415428) (1.231249) 
Bank profitability  11.25613
***
 7.342144 
***
-49.84685
***
(1.459048) (1.491173) (13.79235)
Bank NPL  3.672901
***
3.676579
***
2.540714
***
(0.2491215) (0.2540007) (2.730016)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 217.982 168.986 48.977
Adjusted R2 0.0238 0.0247 0.0441
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 5: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Differences on credit 
granted across firms 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Interbank borrowing -2.25336
***
-1.712026
***
-0.8554626
***
-0.9707708***-0.6460308
***
-0.6176666
***
-0.650853
***
(0.1072225 ) (0.1061598) (0.0274829) (0.0418364) (0.0234731) (0.0142672) (0.0132593)
Firm Size (Assets)*Interbank borrowing 0.1173374
***
(0.0077896)
Firm Size (Turnover)*Interbank borrowing 0.0780517
***
(0.0077795)
Firm Size (Employees)*Interbank borrowing 0.0834106
***
(0.0101056)
Firm Age*Interbank borrowing 0.1398955
***
(0.0160804)
Firm Leverage*Interbank borrowing 0.0353916
(0.0230622)
Firm Interest Coverage*Interbank borrowing -6.88E-06
(0.0000306)
Firm Profitability*Interbank borrowing -5.51e-06
(0.0000311)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 194.676 188.756 186.845 217.973 162.850 162.710 194.582
Adjusted R2 0.0145 0.0169 0.0165 0.0129 0.0138 0.0142 0.0159
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 6: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Firms by Size 
  
Micro&Small Firms Medium Size Firms Big firms
Interbank borrowing -0.3983169
***
-0.3832666
***
-0.3335938 
***
(0.0195179) (0.0646962) (0.0337043)
Bank size 0.080448
***
-0.0505518
***
0.0681724
***
(0.0025704) (0.0646962) (0.004534) 
Bank liquidity 0.3730969
***
 0.2586668
**
0.1792864
***
(0.0428406) (0.1507883) (0.0686095) 
Bank capital -0.7091534
***
0.8157837 -0.2180836
(0.15555) (0.1507883) (0.2574626) 
Bank profitability 13.05786
***
-1.010664  9.414645
***
(1.708964) (5.400746) (2.647844)
Bank NPL 3.781084
***
 5.241335
***
2.294523
***
(0.2893017) (0.7674683) (0.4894338)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 165.751 15.666 65.136
Adjusted R2 0.0304 0.0118 0.0213
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
72 
 
Table 7: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Exporting vs Non 
Exporting Firms 
  
Exporting Company Non-Exporting Company
Interbank borrowing -0.3418908
***
-0.382206
***
(0.0300116) (0.020961)
Bank size 0.0688303
***
0.0715364
***
(0.0040218) (0.0027693) 
Bank liquidity 0.1805444
***
 0.4217657
**
(0.0629654 ) (0.0459093) 
Bank capital -0.3856333 -0.6370852
(0.2353447) (0.1696866) 
Bank profitability 9.052892
***
12.84432
(2.404777) (1.838357)
Bank NPL 2.435147
***
4.33416
***
(0.4290964) (0.3061819 )
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 77.563 140.419
Adjusted R2 0.0217  0.0254  
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 8: Credit Supply during the Global Financial Crisis | Construction and Real 
Estate 
  
CAE 41+42+43 (Construction) CAE 68 (Real Estate)
Interbank borrowing -0.3912978
***
-0.3680432*
**
(0.0382823) (0.0187633)
Bank size 0.0608539
***
0.065546
***
(0.0050462) (0.0024732) 
Bank liquidity 0.3304769
***
 0.3539597
**
(0.0860132) (0.0405723) 
Bank capital -0.7533787
**
-0.7937394
(0.3148582) (0.1504316) 
Bank profitability  8.390679
**
11.54423
(3.306159) (1.602447)
Bank NPL 4.030568
***
 3.743886
***
(0.5443879) (0.2776973)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 46.355 174.481
Adjusted R2 0.0177 0.0231
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 9: Credit Supply during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis | Baseline Model 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Sov. Debt Exposure  0.0003015 0.0143644
***
-0.0545068
***
(0.0033583) (0.0044474) (0.0138206)
Bank size 0.0889383
***
(0.0264452) 
Bank liquidity -12.08496
***
(2.112461) 
Bank capital 0.0961255
(0.7041308) 
Bank leverage -2.48E-06
**
(1.26E-06) 
Bank profitability 12.4222
**
( 5.549773)
Bank NPL  -2.071088
***
(0.7371937)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Number of observations 72.157 72.157 72.157
Adjusted R2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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Table 10: Credit Supply during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis | 5 Largest Banks 
vs Other Banks
 
 
 
 
 
All banks 5 Largest Banks Domestic Banks
Sov. Debt Exposure -0.0545068
***
-.0570334
***
-0.2352569 
***
(0.0138206) (0.0142597) (0.0186682)
Bank size 0.0889383
***
0.0922203 
***
0.3143488
***
(0.0264452) (0.0278347) (0.0336926) 
Bank liquidity -12.08496
***
-12.28438
***
-7.474185
***
(2.112461) (2.203326) (2.40635) 
Bank capital 0.0961255 -0.0993336 -5.200277
(0.7041308) (0.7353858) (0.840139) 
Bank leverage -2.48E-06
**
-2.43E-06* -6.65E-06
**
(1.26E-06) (1.29E-06) (1.26E-06) 
Bank profitability 12.4222
**
11.73163
**
61.26688
**
( 5.549773) (5.707363) (7.126328)
Bank NPL  -2.071088
***
-1.987082
***
-3.310345
***
(0.7371937) (0.7675512) (0.7754462)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 72.157 69.625 59.201
Adjusted R2 0.0064 0.0064 0.0152
***, ** and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
